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ABSTRACT
Prior to this study, critical realignment theory, which presupposes eras of
substantial and sustained swings in American political party dominance, had only
been evaluated using the classical, frequentist approach to modeling. However,
potential for more information concerning these electoral phenomena exists given
a shift in the design and approach to realigning elections. This study sought to
explore those options through one particular alternative to the classical approach
to statistics—in this particular case, the Bayesian approach to statistics.
Bayesian methods differ from the frequentist approach in three main ways:
the treatment of probability, the treatment of parameters, and the treatment of
prior information. This study sought to understand the effect of these differences
as it applied to critical realignment theory: namely, what contribution is made in
understanding the occurrence of these eras from each statistical approach? Does
the Bayesian approach provide any improvements over the classical approach in
terms of understanding critical realignment theory? This first set of research
questions was asked from a political viewpoint, but a second set of research
questions was also posed from a methodological viewpoint: What methods exist
to formally compare these two statistical approaches, and what is the relative
strength of each method? Using the most efficient method of comparison, is any
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further information gained concerning critical realignment theory, and is any
further information gained concerning each statistical approach?
Using multiple linear regression, results were similar across approaches.
For the presidential data, critical elections were found in 1860 and 1932. This was
replicated in the congressional models, with one additional realigning election
found in 1996. As for additional information gained, Bayesian methods aided in
understanding in some ways, but the classical approach also retained some
benefit. Furthermore, these two statistical approaches were formally compared to
one another, highlighting the comparison between credible intervals and
confidence intervals. While these intervals are traditionally considered
counterparts, this is not a direct comparison. These intervals represent different
concepts, relating to underlying differences in the statistical approach. This,
however, reiterates the strong role of correct interpretation as it pertains to results.
Keywords: critical realignment theory, critical elections, Bayesian methods
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2016, the New York Daily News’ front page depicted a red,
white, and blue elephant in a casket. The caption read: “Dearly beloved, we are
gathered here today to mourn the GOP” (New York Daily News, 2016). This
political cartoon referenced the previous day, where Republican candidate Donald
Trump had won the Indiana primary. This win all but guaranteed Trump the party
nomination, which led to a strong reaction by some Republican loyalists. Writing
for the Atlantic, Ball commented that not only were conservatives lining up to
hand in their Republican registrations, but with this nomination, the “old party
establishment went into exile, perhaps never to return” (Ball, 2016). This scene
clearly illustrates a shift of some kind in party systems. While future electorates
and researchers will decide the outcome of the 2016 general election, historians
and academics that study critical realignment theory may not be surprised by this
turn of events. Critical realignment theory presupposes these kinds of shifts in
party systems typically once a generation, practically occurring through the
methods described above. The mobilization, conversion, or as illustrated here, the
demobilization of partisan voters occur, initiating the change in party dominance.
Despite critiques of the theory, the timeliness of these events illustrates the
importance of continued study of these types of elections in the field. Empirical
analyses of the theory to date have only taken a classical statistics approach,
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evaluating national election returns, state and county election returns, and
employing a variety of statistical modeling techniques. Prior to this study, the
approach of Bayesian modeling had yet to be applied to this topic. Consequently,
this study sought to fill that gap by applying Bayesian modeling to critical
realignment theory, with the focus of trying to understand the unique contribution
of Bayesian techniques to the question of critical elections.
Background Information
Before addressing this question, information concerning each concept is
first presented. The next section highlights the essential aspects of critical
realignment theory and Bayesian methods. After providing a brief overview of
critical realignment theory, particular attention is paid to mechanisms that cause
these types of elections as well as critiques of the genre. In regard to Bayesian
modeling, a brief introduction to the approach is presented, followed by a
discussion of the main differences between the classical approach to statistics and
the Bayesian approach to statistics. Lastly, a brief overview of the controversy
concerning measures of statistical significance from the classical perspective is
also introduced, illustrating the necessity for Bayesian modeling.
At its core, critical realignment theory presupposes different realignment
eras or party systems within American electoral history. These realignment eras or
party systems are demarcated and differentiated by the occurrence of a critical
election. For many, critical realignment theory understands electoral history to be
cyclical, with each cycle beginning with a critical election. Three main realigning
elections, also referred to as the canon elections, have been hypothesized: 1860,
2

1896, and 1932 (Norpoth & Rusk, 2007). Other elections, such as 1964 and 2008,
have been under consideration, but these have not been added to the main body of
literature concerning realigning, or critical, elections. A consensus among
researchers pertaining to the status of these hypothesized critical elections has not
been reached due to results differing based on methods employed, data utilized,
and perspectives taken.
Potential causal mechanisms for this group of elections fall into three
categories: conversion of voters, referred to as the conversion thesis;
demobilization of party supporters and party-affiliated voters, referred to as the
demobilization thesis; and the mobilization of inactive or other new voters,
referred to as the mobilization thesis. Conversion of voters relates to party
identification, where, for a variety of reasons, individuals change their party
attachment from one party to the opposing party. The mobilization thesis relates
to the addition of new voters to the electorate, affecting the electoral makeup, and
the demobilization thesis relates to the alienation of previous party supporters, as
mentioned above (Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010).
Previous information presented illustrates support for the theory; however,
not all researchers see value in critical realignment theory. Criticism of the genre
can be grouped into three main points: first, the empirical validity of the theory;
second, the addition of the genre to the body of political science literature; and
third, the relevancy of the genre to the present day. Regarding empirical validity,
critics of the genre find it difficult to replicate studies completed in the field,
citing data availability and integrity concerns. Concerning the addition of the
3

genre to the field of political science, some critics find critical realignment theory
to be limiting and narrow, forcing researchers and students of political science to
unnecessarily see cyclical patterns in American electoral history. Moreover, they
argue that this perspective then limits further exploration into other aspects of
American elections. Lastly, critics argue that according to the traditional
understanding of critical realignment theory, a critical election has not occurred
since 1932, which begs the question of present-day relevance (Mayhew, 2002).
For these reasons, not all researchers fully support the advancement of critical
realignment theory.
Turning away from critical realignment theory, the next section of this
discussion provides a brief introduction to Bayesian modeling. Beginning with its
namesake, Thomas Bayes, an English minister in the early 1700s, understood
rationality as a probabilistic matter: one’s understanding approximates truth as
more evidence is gathered. This understanding was greatly influenced by Isaac
Newton’s work, which suggested that nature, after much observation, follows
regular and predictable patterns (Silver, 2012). Richard Price, a friend and
colleague of Bayes, published this concept of probability posthumously, although
the concept lay dormant until rediscovered by French mathematician Pierre Simon
Laplace (McGrayne, 2012).
With this understanding, Bayes’ theorem is based on conditional
probability: where the probability of one event is predicated on the occurrence of
another event. Within this framework, classical statistics seeks to answer the
question of the probability of a set of outcomes given a specified hypothesis,
4

whereas Bayesian modeling instead assumes the truth of the data and seeks to
answer the question of the probability of the hypothesis given these outcomes.
While more information pertaining to this discussion and a formal presentation of
Bayes’ theorem is provided in the literature review, this is the main point of
difference between the classical approach to statistics and the Bayesian approach
to statistics. In the classical approach, probability is understood as a long-run
sampling frequency of a certain event occurring, assuming constant conditions
across samples. In the Bayesian approach, probability is understood more
subjectively as a degree of uncertainty (van de Schoot et al., 2013).
The second main difference between the classical approach to statistics
and the Bayesian approach to statistics concerns the treatment of prior
information. In Bayesian modeling, prior information is included in the analysis,
as the target parameter, or underlying parameter of interest, is assumed to be
random. This is differentiated from the classical approach to statistics, where the
underlying parameter of interest is assumed to be fixed and simply needs to be
uncovered by repeated sampling. Thus, there is no need for the inclusion of prior
information—the method will result in the ‘true’ parameter (Stokes, Chen, &
Gunes, 2014). The mechanics of inclusion of prior information as well as the
impact on results will be addressed in the literature review.
Stemming from the conceptual differences discussed above, a third
difference between the classical approach to statistics and the Bayesian approach
to statistics is the emphasis on p-values. Much controversy exists around p-values,
but traditionally p-values are used as a measure to indicate statistical significance.
5

Issues regarding the use of this indicator arise as p-values are largely
misunderstood from a definitional standpoint and are associated with a
significance level, which is arbitrarily chosen and greatly influences researchers
with regard to publication (Kirk, 1996). In Bayesian modeling, p-values lose
significance as an indicator as Bayesian analyses approach the null hypothesis
from a different perspective. Given the assumption that the parameter of interest
is random, Bayesian analyses result in and utilize a posterior distribution. It is the
location and the variance of this distribution that aids the researcher (van de
Schoot et al., 2013).
Statement of the Problem
As discussed previously, one main difference between the Bayesian
approach to statistics and the classical approach to statistics is the treatment of
probability. As was mentioned, probability is treated as a long-term frequency of
a particular event occurring in the classical approach to statistics, but is viewed as
the degree of uncertainty concerning the occurrence of a particular event from the
Bayesian viewpoint. To illustrate this difference, consider a coin toss. The
classical perspective takes a very clinical approach to the coin toss: all conditions
must be the same across every toss. Each coin toss is considered a random
replicate of all other coin tosses. However, maintaining precisely the same
conditions for each coin toss is an extremely difficult task, even in a completely
controlled environment. More importantly, however, this requirement of precisely
the same conditions rarely occurs in social science situations. Elections illustrate
this point, as changes in voters, salient issues, and candidates occur at each
6

election. Consequently, the treatment of probability from the classical viewpoint
does not adequately capture the social situation of and social dynamics inherent
within elections.
The inadequacy concerning the treatment and application of probability
from the classical perspective is only compounded by the controversy occurring
over the use and application of p-values as they relate to study results. The lack of
definitional understanding, the use of an arbitrary significance level, and the
dichotomous nature in the application of significance of the p-value severely
limits the practical significance and interpretation of results. This limited
contribution of the p-value in a practical sense compounded with the conceptual
differences in probability between the classical approach and the Bayesian
approach to statistics is what called for a reevaluation of critical realignment
theory from a new perspective.
Purpose of Study
Thus, the purpose of this study was three-fold: first, to evaluate critical
realignment theory from a new perspective; second, to expand the application of
Bayesian modeling to a new field; and third, to formalize an empirical method of
comparison between classical statistics and Bayesian statistics. This resulted in
two sets of research questions. The first set of research questions was concerned
with the qualitative contribution of this study to the field of political science.
These questions are given below:
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1. Viewed from a national perspective, what contribution does the classical
approach to statistics make in terms of increasing understanding regarding
the occurrence of critical elections?

2. Viewed from a national perspective, what contribution does the Bayesian
approach to statistics make in terms of increasing understanding regarding
the occurrence of critical elections?

3. With regards to the identification of critical elections, does Bayesian
modeling provide improvements, and, if so, what improvements over the
classical approach?
While answering these research questions entailed empirical analysis, the focus of
these questions was substantive in nature. The reason for addressing these
questions from a qualitative viewpoint was because each approach conceptualizes
probability, parameters, and prior information differently. The real intent of these
questions was to understand how these different conceptualizations affect the
practical result provided at the end of the analysis. In other words, the goal of
these questions was to highlight qualitatively the difference in understanding
gained surrounding critical realignment theory from the two different approaches.
The answers to these particular research questions detail the contribution to the
field of political science.
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The second set of research questions was concerned with the quantitative
contribution of this study to the field of research methods and statistics. In
addition to applying Bayesian methods to a new field of study, this study also
sought to formalize an empirical method of comparison between the classical
approach to statistics and the Bayesian approach to statistics. This was done by
first evaluating current methods of comparison for their relative strength, and then
applying the most efficient method of comparison to the topic of critical
realignment theory to see what additional information can be learned about the
theory, but also about the two approaches. The most efficient method of
comparison was defined as the method with the highest relative strength. This set
of research questions is given below:
1. Given different methods of comparison between the classical approach to
statistics and the Bayesian approach to statistics, what are the relative
strengths of each method?

2. Using the most efficient method of comparison, is any further information
gained in applying this method to critical realignment theory, and if so,
what is that contribution?

3. By applying the most efficient method of comparison to the example of
critical realignment theory, is any further information gained regarding the
two approaches, and if so, what is that contribution?
9

The focus of this set of questions was quantitative in nature and critical
realignment theory is used as an example to illuminate differences in the two
approaches. The goal of these questions was to provide a formal, empirical
method of comparison between the two approaches, and through the process,
highlight the relative strengths and weaknesses of each method. If, through a
comparative lens, the implications for each approach can be realized, researchers
would be better informed as to when to apply each approach appropriately. This
details the contribution to the field of research methods and statistics.
To answer the first set of questions, the occurrence of critical elections at
the traditionally understood time intervals (1860, 1896, and 1932) with the
addition of the 1964 election were first evaluated through multiple regression as
applied from the classical approach. This was then replicated by applying multiple
regression, but from the Bayesian perspective. Given the use of prior information
in Bayesian modeling, sets of regressions both including and excluding prior
information were run to assess the impact of this added knowledge. This process
was applied to both presidential and congressional elections, accounting for the
differences in realignment eras for Congress. Results from these models
addressed the first set of research questions.
To answer the second set of research questions, different methods of
comparison were first evaluated conceptually for their relative strength. Then, the
most efficient method was applied to critical realignment theory to see if any
additional information can be gained regarding the theory. Using critical
10

realignment theory as an example, the most efficient method was again applied,
but this time the focus was on information gained regarding the two approaches.
Scope and Limitations of Study
The scope of this study was limited to an evaluation of the traditional
framework of critical realignment theory. This means that this study took a
national, structural approach and was limited to an evaluation of the canon
elections with the addition of the 1964 election. Given the national scope, this
study only utilized national indicators: presidential election returns and share of
U.S. House seats, spanning the period from 1828 to 2008.
Limitations to this study also existed. The most impactful limitation was
the conceptualization and operationalization of critical realignment theory from
such a viewpoint as the structural one depicted here. As will be demonstrated in
the literature review, the viewpoint of the researcher can affect the interpretation
of the results. Tangentially, a second limitation was the conceptualization and
rationale behind specifying the fourth critical election for congressional analysis
at a different timepoint than the presidential analysis. This is based on the
developments within the field and is supported by historical data; however, this
conceptualization can affect study results. Thirdly, the use of national indicators,
as opposed to sub-national indicators, can also bias results. Fourthly, utilizing
U.S. election data, this study was reliant upon the accuracy of data gathered by
published governmental data sources, such as the Office of the Clerk within the
U.S. House of Representatives and the Guide to U.S. elections, published by the
CQ Press.
11

Definition of Terms
Within academic circles pertaining to critical realignment theory, different
researchers use different vocabulary to describe different electoral phenomena.
One example of this is the use of the term realignment, compared to realigning
era, critical election, or even epoch. For clarity within this study, those terms are
defined within this section. As demonstrated in Figure 1 below, a critical election
is the specific election, either general or congressional, at which the change in
party dominance is first seen. A realigning era is the political context or
atmosphere in which the critical election occurs; thus it spans time both before
and after the critical election. A realignment, then, is the span of time in which the
change in party dominance is sustained. This encompasses the critical election, as
that is when the change in party dominance is first realized. For the purposes of
this study, realignment, era, and epoch are used interchangeably.
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C

A

1860

1864

1872

1868

B

1852

1856

Key:
A: denotes a critical election.
B: denotes a realigning era.
C: denotes a realignment, era, or epoch.

Figure 1. Illustration of terms pertaining to critical realignment theory.
Although this may be self-evident, one other important differentiation
pertains to the vocabulary surrounding the different approaches to statistics
utilized in this study. References to the Bayesian approach to statistics will be
referred to as such; however, the classical approach to statistics is also referred to
as the frequentist approach. Presumably, this is due to the understanding of
probability within this approach.
Organization of Study
As discussed above, Bayesian modeling had yet to be applied to the
question of critical realignment theory. This study sought to fill that gap in
knowledge, and by doing so, better reflect the social situations of and inherent
13

dynamics within elections. To reach this goal, two sets of models were run: one
set of models from the classical approach to statistics, and a second set of models
from the Bayesian perspective, across which comparisons were made. The
importance of this study stems from exploration of the application of Bayesian
modeling to the question of critical elections, but also by bringing Bayesian
techniques into a new genre within political science. Limitations to this study
exist, such as the accuracy of data and the operationalization of critical
realignment theory. The next section of this study provides a review of the
literature, including overview of the origins and current work in the arena of
critical realignment theory. It also includes a description of Bayesian modeling
and discusses differing perspectives on indicators of statistical significance in the
classical approach. The literature review is followed by a methods section, which
describes the data utilized in and analysis plan for this study. Results are then
presented, followed by a discussion of the practical significance of such results
and of the study as a whole.
Critical Realignment Theory
Critical realignment theory was first introduced to the arena of political
science in the late 1950s, enjoying the height of its study through the 1970s. Many
researchers today reference V.O. Key as providing the basis of the theory, with
Schattschneider (1960), Burnham (1970), Sundquist (1973), and Kleppner (1987)
as main contributors (Brunell, Grofman, & Merrill III, 2012; Bullock, Hoffman,
& Gaddie, 2006; Campbell, 2006; Stonecash & Silina, 2005). Beginning with a
theoretical summary, this section of the literature review starts with a discussion
14

of the theory from the perspective of these five writers before evaluating practical
and current work being completed in this field. This section of the literature
review closes by discussing those that disagree with the theory and their rationale
for doing so.
The founding theorists conceptualized critical, or realigning, elections
from different perspectives, resulting in similar but yet differentiated definitions.
Starting from a framework of elections more broadly, Key (1955) perceived
critical elections as stemming from a hypothetical typology of elections; thus,
these elections were simply one of many types. He did not necessarily advocate
for the full development of a typology, but his definition represents this
framework. He defined elections as acts of “collective decision,” occurring in a
timeline of previous and subsequent behavior. Realigning elections, then, are also
acts of collective decision, but where the outcome of the election results in an
alteration of party cleavages. Key went further, and stated that the true
differentiating feature of realignments is that the sharp change in party lines
persists for multiple succeeding elections. This second statement of sustaining
new party cleavages within the electorate is seen as necessary, from a definitional
standpoint, for all of the other major contributors (Burnham, 1970; Kleppner,
1987; Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1973).
Kleppner (1987) continued to advocate for Key’s broad framework of a
typology of elections, but also extended this perspective and began to link this
definition to underlying causes. Following Key, Kleppner perceived critical
realignments as partitioning electoral history into times of relative stability, but
15

also stated that critical realignments should be understood as aggregate-level
phenomena that are shaped by any one, or a combination, of several possible
patterns of individual behavior. Burnham moved this perspective one step further,
shifting the focus from a broader framework of elections to a framework of
collective social action. The shift in focus is evident in how Burnham defined
critical realignments: “eras … marked by short, sharp reorganizations of the mass
coalitional bases of the major parties which occur at periodic intervals on the
national level” (Burnham, 1970, p. 10). He moved from Key and Kleppner’s
national viewpoint to a grassroots, coalitional viewpoint, emphasizing the role of
the individual in his or her party base.
As previously stated, Burnham retained the aggregated aspect present in
Key and Kleppner’s perspectives, but shifted from viewing critical realignments
in the macro context of electoral history to viewing critical realignments as
movements of the social base of the parties. This shift is evident in Sundquist’s
writings, where he also emphasized a grassroots and more humanistic approach to
critical realignments. Sundquist (1973) defined critical realignments as an organic
change in the party system, where the political norm shifts. Typically, this results
in the relocation of the ‘line’ or cleavage between the two party bases, but
Sundquist was careful to note that significant shifts in relative party strength can
also occur even if the line were to remain fixed. Schattschneider (1960) presented
a similar argument, seeing critical elections as changes in political cleavages. He
referred to these changes as sectional alliances, but argued that sectionalism
actually depresses party organization. This is because sectional alliances can cross
16

parties and draw new cleavages across the electorate. However, as is evident from
this discussion, Schattschneider, Sundquist, Burnham, and to some degree
Kleppner, focused on the coalitional, individual, and social aspect of critical
realignments, which is differentiated from Key’s macro viewpoint of critical
elections within the electoral history.
As discussed, slight differences exist in the perspectives of the main
contributing writers to the theory of critical realignment. However, these main
contributors tended to describe the characteristics of critical elections in the same
way. Critical elections are characterized by deeply concerned and highly
polarized voters (Key, 1955), where the ideological distance between parties
increases (Burnham, 1970). Voter turnout increases and these elections redivide
the electorate along new sets of cleavages at the national level (Key, 1955;
Schattschneider, 1960), resulting in significant transformations of policy as voting
patterns change (Burnham, 1970; Kleppner, 1987). However, this dynamic is also
contingent on the size of the group or party, as well as the behavior of other
groups or parties (Kleppner, 1987). Furthermore, these changes persist, and are
not simply an interruption from the current political system or norm (Burnham,
1970; Key, 1955; Kleppner, 1987; Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1973).
Driving Factors behind Realignments. From this introduction, it is
apparent that critical elections are worthy of study. As Darmofal and Nardulli
(2010) state:
The reason for this interest is clear: in contrast to normal voting eras,
during critical realignments citizens reject their habitual voting behaviors
to hold political elites accountable and forge non-incremental change in
17

policy outputs. As a consequence, a central concern regarding critical
realignments is the identification of the particular changes in voting
behavior through which citizens are exerting elite accountability. (p. 256)
One reason for critical realignments is highlighted in this statement—that is, to
hold political elites accountable. However, many other ideas have been formed
about how realigning elections occur. In this next section, the discussion turns to
these ideas: otherwise referred to as the conversion thesis, mobilization thesis, and
demobilization thesis.
Conversion Thesis. At its core, the conversion thesis relates to party
identification. Committed individuals, for a variety of reasons, change their party
attachment from one party to the opposing party (Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010).
Such conversion will result in a critical election if it occurs for a large enough
number of the electorate (Burnham, 1970; Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010; Kleppner,
1987; Sundquist, 1973; Zingher, 2014). This occurs for the following three
reasons: strength of local and state parties, group membership, and the rise of
divisive issues. Firstly, the strength of the local and state parties can incite change
in party identification (Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010). This is due to the level of
activism present within the party at the local level. Secondly, membership in
certain social groups can influence individual partisanship. This creates a
restructuring of party coalitions whenever the voting behavior of these groups
change, and as the ratio of these groups within the electorate change (Zingher,
2014). Thirdly, the rise of divisive issues can also cause changes in party
identification. As these polarizing issues enter the arena of political discourse,
18

tensions within the political system can arise, causing party leaders to become
more dogmatic and rigid in party norms, party platforms, and party processes. The
rigidity of the established party leadership causes these concepts of party norms,
platforms, and processes to become more polarizing instead of integrative. This
creates sometimes emotional, but almost always disaffected, voters, which can
lead to individual conversion and a change in party identification (Burnham,
1970). These ideas, related to the change in individual partisanship, are generally
what constitute the conversion thesis.
Mobilization Thesis. While the conversion thesis focuses on a change in
party identification, one could conceptualize the mobilization thesis as individuals
gaining a sense of party attachment. The mobilization thesis revolves around the
idea of inciting previous non-voters to vote (Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010). The
incitement of these previous non-voters is a reflection of the political climate at
the time. The high intensity and frequent political stimuli within the current
political climate affects these new voters differently than more experienced voters
(Andersen, 1979; Beck, 1982; Wanat & Burke, 1982). The voting behavior of this
group of voters changes the fabric of the electorate that ultimately can cause a
critical election (Sundquist, 1973). These voters generally come from three main
populations: the local immigrant population, coming-of-age voters, and inactive
voters (Kleppner, 1987; Zingher, 2014).
Demobilization Thesis. Differentiated from the mobilization thesis, the
demobilization thesis focuses on the alienation of active, partisan voters. This
alienation can occur through a couple of different avenues: firstly, intentionally by
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the party system through new regulations on voter registration, such as the
increased residency requirements in the late 1920s; or secondly, unintentionally
through individual or group disillusionment with the party platform (Kleppner,
1987). Either method results in the same conclusion: previous voters differentially
abstain during an election cycle, which offsets the balance of the parties, shifts
party cleavages, and results in a critical election. Demobilization, or differential
abstention, explains more electoral change prior to the 1950s and 1960s, whereas
conversion appears to be the main contributor of electoral change post the Civil
Rights era (Shively, 1992).
The conversion thesis, mobilization thesis, and demobilization thesis
provide some insight into how critical elections occur. However, changes may not
all occur within the same election cycle. The complexity of the American
electoral system is too great to assume that the effect of grassroots movements or
top-down approaches will be felt immediately within the electorate. Key (1955)
realized this, denoting a difference between critical realignments and secular
realignments, also referred to as the lingering ‘drift’ toward a different party
identification. These two types of realignments are not necessarily distinct; one
can think of a secular realignment as the “aftershock” of a critical election
(Sundquist, 1973). Furthermore, regions may shift at different points, and
different indicators may be affected to varying degrees (Bullock, Hoffman, &
Gaddie, 2006). However, given that the basis of critical realignments involves the
transformation of the political norm or system, they should be thought of as
national, macro events, and thus analyzed as such (Kleppner, 1987).
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While these might be macro events, very real, sociological aspects
accompany the occurrence of such events. As political cleavages shift or change,
new groups of disaffected voters emerge. These are individuals who are
dissatisfied with the current political climate, and sometimes so upset that they
seek political avenues, such as activism, to have their voice heard (Schofield,
Miller, & Martin, 2003). A lack of trust oftentimes undergirds the level of
dissatisfaction, aimed at the governing party or the leading candidates in an
election cycle (Brooks, 2016). This further cements the political divide, creating a
highly polarized, divisive, and hot climate in which social trust must be rebuilt in
order to overcome gridlock.
Hypothesized Electoral Eras. Given this theoretical basis of critical
realignment theory, the discussion now turns toward previous work completed on
the topic. For most researchers, the main question is still whether a realigning
election has occurred at specific timepoints, although the traditional “canon”
elections are 1860, 1896, and 1932 (Norpoth & Rusk, 2007). The election of 1964
has since been under evaluation as to whether it can be deemed part of the canon,
and some researchers do consider it as such. However, this section will evaluate
each proposed election in turn, paying particular attention to measurement,
method, and results after providing some background information on the political
climate at the time.
Considered the first election of the canon (Norpoth & Rusk, 2007), the
election of 1860 is considered a realignment for two main reasons: firstly, the
electoral returns demonstrated a newly created division among the electorate
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(Schofield, Miller, & Martin, 2003); and secondly, the outbreak of the Civil War
provided evidence of political shifts internally (Hawley & Sagarzazu, 2012).
Regarding the newly created division among the electorate, prior to 1852
Democratic and Whig vote shares were comparable. Neither party dramatically
outperformed the other party with reference to general elections. However, in the
election of 1860, this dynamic changed. The Whig party candidate, Bell, only
won three states, and the two Democratic party candidates took ten states in the
South. Of course, the Republican contender, Abraham Lincoln, won a majority of
the popular vote in 15 northern and western states, winning the presidency.
However, this election illuminated the split between Whig and Democratic party
vote shares, suggesting a realignment of electoral support (Schofield, Miller, &
Martin, 2003). Current work on this topic, however, challenges this historical
account. Using county-level data and analyzing vote transfers through ecological
inference models, evidence for a realignment in 1860 is not found (Hawley &
Sagarzazu, 2012). Taking a national perspective, some evidence is found in House
seats; however, the durability of the realignment is questioned if one accounts for
a potential realignment in 1874, if one excludes the South due to the advent of
Civil War, and if one considers a realignment to be a shift in party dominance
(Norpoth & Rusk, 2007).
The second election of the canon (Norpoth & Rusk, 2007) continued to
favor the Republicans. The economic panic during 1893 under Democratic
control greatly aided the Republican party, allowing Republicans to propagate
prosperity and place blame for unemployment on the Democrats. Such
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propagation was highly effective, reducing the linkages between class affiliation
(i.e., working class) and party affiliation. Consequently, net movement across at
least the New England states was toward Republicans, and only wavered in
degree (Key, 1955). Simultaneously, the Populist movement swept the South and
threatened to overthrow the current political order. Conservatives within both
parties were so concerned and reacted so strongly to this movement that the
legacy and southern ties of the Reconstruction arose again, creating a
noncompetitive, one-party, sectional ‘Solid South.’ A similar dynamic happened
in the North among the conservative business community. Concerned with the
nomination of William Jennings Bryan on a Populist platform, the northern
business community sought to work against him (Schattschneider, 1956). In
Schattschneider’s words, “the resulting alignment was one of the most sharply
sectional political divisions in American history” (1956, p. 201). Empirical work
on this election, however, provides mixed results. Burnham (1970) utilized
regression residuals, systematically moving through comparison pairs of elections
within ten-year spans. He compared the average mean difference in residuals over
the ten-year spans, and his analysis resulted in the identification of a realignment
between 1893-95 and 1927-31. However, replicating his analysis, Stonecash and
Silina (2005) disagree with Burnham. They argue that the change was not abrupt,
leading these authors to advocate for more evaluation of gradual change when
considering realigning eras. Campbell (2006) utilized similar data sources as
Burnham, although performed a series of multiple regressions instead of a
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residual analysis. He concluded that the election did result in a change in party
dominance.
After a period of Republican hegemony in politics, the Democrats made
gains in New England states with candidate Alfred E. Smith in the 1928 general
election. This was largely due to the mobilization of the local immigrant
population, namely low-income, urban Catholic voters. In 1932, Roosevelt
retained these gains and sustained the realignment. Key (1955) evaluated the
possibility of a realignment circa 1932 by comparing two cities in New England.
He demonstrates that while this trend could have started in 1920, evidence for the
realignment is most convincing in 1928. In 1920, the difference in Democratic
percentage of presidential vote between these two cities was approximately 5
percentage points. However, by 1924, the difference grew to approximately 26
percentage points, and by 1928, the difference in Democratic percentage of the
presidential vote measured at 42 percentage points. This illustrates that the
campaign of Alfred Smith in the 1928 election created a new cleavage across the
electorate, culminating in a critical election (Key, 1955). Looking qualitatively,
the election of 1932 also signaled a shift in the conceptualization of party systems.
Within the context of the Great Depression, voters used the only political
instrument available to them--the Democratic party--to overthrow or cast out the
Republican party. This action was not taken because the Democratic party was so
well-prepared for the challenge of the Great Depression, but because the
electorate was choosing to hold the Republican party responsible, bringing about
the advent of the responsible party system (Schattschneider, 1960). This change
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was so great that Schattschneider (1960) referred to it as the “revolution of 1932”
(p. 206). More recent work on this election supports the conclusion of a critical
realignment. Variations in method, such as multiple regression, geographically
weighted regressions, ecological inference models, or simply bivariate tests
between pairs of elections, do not change this result. Similarly, utilizing national,
subnational, or county-level data on presidential vote returns or vote transfers also
does not change this conclusion (Brunell, Grofman, & Merrill III, 2012;
Campbell, 2006; Darmofal, 2008; Hawley & Sagarzazu, 2012; Kantor, Fishback,
& Wallis, 2013).
While the election of 1964 is not a part of the canon of critical
realignments as traditionally understood, some have argued for its demarcation as
such given the regional importance of the election and its effect on southern white
voters (Black & Black, 1992; Carmines, Huckfeldt, & McCurley, 1995; Carmines
& Stimson, 1989). At that time, the Republican party was not the favored party of
most white southerners given the legacy of the Reconstruction. For the same
reason, the Republican party had also attracted many black voters. However this
alignment began to change in the 1960s. The Democratic party was becoming
more liberal on racial issues as the Republican party was becoming more
conservative. The outcome of these dynamics resulted in the Republican
nomination of Barry Goldwater, and effectively instituting change in the positions
of the two parties on race (Buchanan, 2002; Shelley, Zerr, & Proffer, 2007). One
main requirement of a critical election is a change in party loyalties; racial issues
of the time provided that impetus (Carmines & Stimson, 1989).
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As one can see, the Civil Rights movement carried immense impact on
political attitudes, and most researchers agree that a realignment occurred
(Buchanan, 2002; Burnham, 1970; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Feinstein &
Schickler, 2008; Schofield, Miller, & Martin, 2003). However, explanations
behind the occurrence of the realignment differ among researchers. Some take a
more traditional view, arguing that U.S. politics necessitates two dimensions of
policy. This means that whatever position presidential candidates adopt, there is
always a group of disaffected voters. These voters may be mobilized by third
parties, or absorbed into other dominant parties. Realignments are the result of
these policy compromises, changes, or stances (Schofield, Miller, & Martin,
2003). Others draw a more complex view, stating that political transformations
emerge from the intersection of multiple policy trajectories. For example, the
party system was reshaped in the 1930s as the Democrats embraced New Deal
liberalism, which then intersected with a second trajectory of civil rights as
grassroots activists pushed this issue onto the national scene (Feinstein &
Schickler, 2008). A third explanation revolves around issue evolution. Issue
evolution is a process by which party coalitions can change, as voting defections
among partisans occur and links between citizen and party are broken. These are
issues that arise from the old party system and introduce tension into a newly
forming party system. These issues capture the public’s attention for a longer
period of time, and tend to be salient in the minds of voters (Carmines & Stimson,
1989). As is evident, all of these explanations could explain the election of 1964.
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Up until this point in this discussion, the trends discussed are fairly
consistent across presidential vote returns and congressional distributions of
House seats. However, that dynamic changes around the 1960s. While the
Republicans made inroads in presidential voting in the 1950s and 1960s as
discussed above, this change was not immediately reflected in the distribution of
House seats. Between 1954 and 1980, Democrats maintained the majority by 16
percentage points, on average. However, this gap dwindled to 2 percentage points
by 1984, and by 1994, Republicans regained majority status in the House for the
first time in forty years (Campbell, 2006). Some perceived this delayed
Republican victory as a reflection of a long-term shift in party loyalties within the
electorate (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998). Regardless, this is further evidence of
how different indicators can yield different results.
Critiques of the Genre. In spite of the discussion above, not all
researchers agree with Key’s seminal proposal of critical elections. David
Mayhew (2002) is a strong critic not only of the empirical work completed, but of
the entire genre. His critique is based on three main points: firstly, the validity of
the theory; secondly, the “illuminative power of the genre” (p. 35); and thirdly,
the lack of relevancy of the theory to the present day. Concerning validity, some
researchers, including Mayhew, have found it difficult to replicate and carry out
previous work done on critical realignments. While some data are available and
replication can be attempted, this is not always feasible (Lichtman, 1976;
Mayhew, 2002). Concerning Mayhew’s second point, he argues that it has always
been obvious that certain elections are more important than others. Consequently,
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he is interested in the additive effect of this genre to arena of political science and
its contribution to the study of elections. Other researchers agree, stating that
periodization of American electoral history is helpful, although they find flaws in
the realignment framework. While not the initial intent of Key (1955), many
researchers see realignment theory as purely dichotomous: either an election is
realigning, or it is not. This dichotomy creates dissonance when attempting to
classify elections (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). Another flaw is the sole focus on
realignments. Realignments are time-bound and geographically and
chronologically constrained. Thus, while rhythms may exist within American
electoral history, realignment theory has not given enough consideration to the
constraints placed on elections (Shafer, 1991; Silbey, 1991). A third flaw is a
gross oversimplification of party change, which has resulted in a constricted view
of American political history and a demotivation among political researchers to
more fully understand a potentially more intricate pattern of stability and change
(Lichtman, 1976).
Mayhew’s third point of relevancy also deserves some discussion. At the
time of writing his critique, a critical election had not been identified in the last 60
years. He argues that for a cyclical theory, this presents a problem. He
hypothesizes that with more advanced survey techniques, parties are able to better
understand their party base and supporters and pinpoint the median voter. This
has reduced the amount of polarization in general elections, and thus realignments
(Mayhew, 2002). However, Sundquist (1973), one of the main contributors,
argues that the failure of a realignment in the 1960s was due to the lack of a
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triggering event. Regardless, the relevancy of critical realignment theory is
questioned as realignments have not occurred as predicted, or at all (Gans, 1985;
Mayhew, 2002; Silbey, 1991).
From a review of the literature, more insight is gained regarding the
background of the 1860, 1896, 1932, and 1964 general elections. Controversy
exists regarding the denotation of these elections as realigning, and current work
in this field brings no resolution. Reasons for realignment are also discussed, as
well as critiques to the genre and differences between presidential and
congressional elections. However, in reviewing methods utilized in evaluating
these elections, Bayesian techniques have yet to be applied. The next section
provides an introduction to Bayesian modeling.
Bayesian Approach to Statistics
The next section provides an introduction to Bayesian modeling. It begins
with some background regarding the origins of the theory, moves through a
formal presentation of Bayes’ theorem, and discusses components of Bayesian
inference and model fit procedures before ending with a comparison to a classical
statistics approach.
Origins of the Bayesian Approach. Thomas Bayes was an English
minister in the late 1700s. He grew up in Hertfordshire, a southeastern county in
England, but gained his education from the University of Edinburgh (Silver,
2012). Despite few publications, Bayes was elected as a Fellow of the Royal
Society on November 4, 1742 (The Royal Society, 2017), and likely served as a
mediator of intellectual debates. Although published posthumously by friend and
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colleague Richard Price in 1763, one of Bayes’ more famous works, “An Essay
toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances,” focused on the formation
of probabilistic beliefs as new data are encountered.
Bayes was greatly influenced by and a strong advocate of Isaac Newton’s
work, which suggested that nature follows predictable patterns. Thus, the
argument made by Bayes and Price is not that the world is naturally probabilistic,
but that one’s knowledge is gained through probabilistic means. The example
provided by Bayes and Price concerns a caveman: the caveman emerges from a
cave, and sees the sun for the first time. He is unsure whether this is a typical
occurrence, but as the sun rises each sequential morning, he gains confidence that
this is a permanent fixture of nature. In the Bayesian viewpoint, then, learning is
done through approximation: as more evidence is gathered, it more clearly
reflects truth (Silver, 2012).
Although published by his friend in 1763, Bayes’ thoughts on the topic lay
dormant for about a decade. Working a little after Bayes, Pierre-Simon Laplace, a
French mathematician, independently rediscovered Bayes’ mechanism and
published his work in 1774. However, due to Price and a visit to Paris, Laplace
eventually learned of Bayes’ earlier work and credited him with the idea.
Regardless, Laplace contributed substantially to the promulgation of Bayes’
theorem, as he derived the formal statement of the theory (McGrayne, 2012).
Advancement of the theory persisted; however, concerns about the
subjective nature of the prior probabilities led to debate regarding the entire
approach. These conversations surrounding Bayesian methods continued, and
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given the rise of the ‘classical’ approach promulgated by R.A. Fisher and Karl
Popper in the 1920s, Bayesian methods were scarcely taught in universities and
even then, it was more so to dismiss the approach. In recent times, however, there
has been some return of the method to the university level (Howson & Urbach,
2006).
Mechanics of Bayesian Inference. Using Bayes’ ideas and Laplace’s
formalization of the theory, this discussion turns toward an applied discussion of
Bayes’ theory. At its core, Bayes’ theorem is a statement of conditional
probability. Conditional probability is an expressed degree of uncertainty based
on some prior knowledge (Downey, 2012). For example, suppose one is interested
to know the probability of an incumbent maintaining his House seat. Using the
results of the 2012 House races, an incumbent had a 90% chance of winning his
race (Giroux, 2012). However, suppose boundary lines for House districts moved.
Now, the probability cannot be appropriately estimated at 90% as districts have
changed. Here, the question changes from the percent chance of an incumbent
maintaining his seat to the percent chance of an incumbent maintaining his seat,
given that district boundaries changed. This second probability is conditional, as it
accounts for other factors that are unique to this race. The notation for this is
particular probability is p(A|B), which is read as “the probability of A given that B
is true” (Downey, 2012, p. 2), or in the context of the example, as the probability
of the incumbent maintaining his House seat given that district boundaries
changed.
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With the concept of conditional probability now presented, Bayes’
theorem takes this form (Downey, 2012; Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014):

𝑝 𝜃𝑦 =

% & %

𝑦𝜃

(1)

% '

and where 𝑝 𝑦 is understood as:
𝑝 𝜃 𝑝 𝑦𝜃 𝑑 𝜃

(2)

and where 𝜃 is understood as the unknown parameter of interest, and 𝑦 represents
the observed data. This means that 𝑝 𝜃 represents the prior distribution, 𝑝(𝑦)
represents the probability of the observed data, and 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) represents the
probability of the unknown parameter conditional on the observed data. These
topics are addressed more fully in the next paragraph. This theorem is what forms
the basis of Bayesian inference. It uses probabilities that are conditional on data to
express beliefs about unknown quantities (Downey, 2012; StataCorp, 2015;
Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014). The conditional nature of Bayes’ theorem means
that Bayesian inference has the ability to update beliefs about model parameters
by accounting for additional data (Downey, 2012; StataCorp, 2015; Stokes, Chen,
& Gunes, 2014; van de Schoot et al., 2013), as model parameters are assumed to
be random. It is because of this assumption of the randomness of model
parameters that prior knowledge can be incorporated (StataCorp, 2015). If it were
assumed that model parameters were fixed—as in the frequentist approach—the
addition of prior knowledge would not carry an effect on the parameters or on the
analysis. This is a main point of difference between the classical and Bayesian
approaches and relates back to the Bayesian understanding of probability. Instead
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of understanding probability as a long-run frequency, probability is understood as
an expressed degree of uncertainty. Treating probability this way implies that
parameters are random, which brings about the necessity or the opportunity for
the use of prior distributions. It is the fundamental difference in the understanding
of probability that allows for these effects to be seen.
Thus, Bayesian inference has three main components: the prior
distribution, the evidence at hand (also referred to as the likelihood), and the
posterior distribution. The prior distribution is combined with the evidence at
hand to create the posterior distribution (StataCorp, 2015; Stokes, Chen, & Gunes,
2014). The evidence at hand represents the data collected or gathered for the
current analysis, whereas the prior distribution is a reflection of prior knowledge
about the topic. More specifically, since a prior distribution must be chosen for
each model parameter, the variance of the prior distribution reflects the level of
uncertainty regarding the population value of that parameter. The larger the
variance of the prior distribution, the higher the level of uncertainty (van de
Schoot et al, 2013). Please refer to Figure 2 to see this concept displayed visually.
The selections of distributions in Figure 2 illustrate various levels of prior
knowledge concerning the average math ability for a group of students.
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Figure 2a

Figure 2b

Figure 2c

Figure 2d

Figure 2. Prior distributions illustrating varying levels of uncertainty. Adapted
from A Gentle Introduction to Bayesian Analysis: Applications to Developmental
Research, p. 5, by van de Schoot et al., 2013, Society for Research in Child
Development.
Figure 2 displays four prior distributions concerning the average math
ability for a group of students. Assuming that this is assessed via a skills test
where the range of possible scores is 40 through 180, Figure 2a illustrates a noninformative prior. Each value between 40 and 180 is equally likely to be the mean
of the group of students. This represents an assumption that nothing is known
about the mean math ability for the given population prior to the start of the study.
This is in contrast to informative priors, which are displayed in Figures 2b-2d.
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Figure 2b represents the expectation that the mean is 100, as opposed to a very
low score or a very high score, but substantial uncertainty exists concerning this
expectation because the scores vary from very low to very high. The variance of
this distribution is greater than that of Figure 2c. Figure 2c also expects a mean
math ability of 100, but with less uncertainty. Figure 2d displays an assumption of
higher uncertainty concerning the mean math ability, but expects a lower mean
score for the population. As is evidenced by this figure, prior distributions can be
more or less informative. However, it is important to realize that while a noninformative prior can appear as more objective, it does not represent complete
ignorance about the parameter in question. There is a degree of subjectivity
associated with the choosing of any prior distribution (Stokes, Chen, & Gunes,
2014). A second, important classification of prior distributions concerns the
degree of conjugacy between the prior and posterior distributions. The prior
distribution is considered to be conjugate if it and the resulting posterior
distribution are found in the same family of distributions. Conjugate priors are
used more frequently for mainly two reasons: firstly, their use simplifies
computations; and secondly, the resulting posterior distribution becomes
interpretable as additional data and thus can be used to update the analysis as the
next prior distribution (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995). However,
conjugate priors may not necessarily represent the model parameters realistically
and due to the limited number of conjugate priors, the overuse of these
distributions limits the flexibility found in Bayesian modeling (StataCorp, 2015).
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As previously stated, the likelihood is combined with prior information to
create the posterior distribution. Less uncertainty should exist in the posterior
distribution, given the inclusion of both prior information and data at hand
(Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995; van de Schoot et al., 2013). Gelman
references this as a “compromise,” stating that the posterior distribution is
centered at a point of compromise between the prior distribution and the data, and
this point of compromise is increasingly controlled by the data as the sample size
increases (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995). See Figure 3 for a visual
display of this concept. However, given that the prior distribution and the
likelihood are combined mathematically through integrals (Holmes, n.d.), the
posterior distribution is obtained via simulation using Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods (Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014; van de Schoot et al., 2013).
These methods generate a series of samples from the target distribution and
compute the posterior estimates of interest using Monte Carlo Markov chains—a
numerical integration method that finds the expectation of an integral (Stokes,
Chen, & Gunes, 2014). It is from this simulated distribution that point estimates
are derived. The posterior distribution reflects all current information known
concerning the parameter: the location of the distribution is summarized by the
mean, median, and mode, and the variation is summarized by the standard
deviation and interquartile range. The mean represents the posterior expectation
of the parameter and the mode may be interpreted as the single “most likely”
value of the parameter, given the data. These statistics are reported as results of
the analysis, in addition to a report of posterior uncertainty, or variance (Gelman,
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Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995). Oftentimes, the credibility interval, also referred to
as the posterior probability interval (PPI), is reported, which is the counterpart of
the frequentist confidence interval (StataCorp, 2015; van de Schoot et al., 2013).

Figure 3. Visual display of the combination of the prior distribution and the
likelihood to create the posterior distribution. Adapted from A Gentle Introduction
to Bayesian Analysis: Applications to Developmental Research, p. 8, by van de
Schoot et al., 2013, Society for Research in Child Development.
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When comparing two Bayesian models, model fit is also reported. It is
traditionally assessed through the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and deviance information criterion (DIC)
(StataCorp, 2015; Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014). These fit indices do not provide
overall model fit, however, but instead are used as comparative statistics across
models. The BIC is more conservative than the AIC, but all three are appropriate
for non-informative priors in Bayesian modeling. A difference is that the DIC is
designed specifically for Bayesian estimation that involves MCMC sampling. An
additional type of fit index, the Bayes Factor (BF), has also been developed and
represents the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of two competing models. A
Bayes Factor essentially computes the relative probabilities of how well each
model fits the data compared to the base model (StataCorp, 2015). While this is
helpful when comparing two models directly, it is computationally very
difficult—so much so that it led to the development of the other aforementioned
indices (Berg, Meyer, & Yu, 2012).
Differences between the Bayesian and Frequentist Approach to
Statistics. Given this presentation of Bayesian methods, it is evident that many
differences exist between the Bayesian approach and the frequentist approach.
These differences are summarized primarily in the expression of probability, the
treatment of parameters, and the reporting of statistics. Fundamentally and at its
core, the Bayesian approach to statistics views probability as “the subjective
experience of uncertainty” (van de Schoot et al., 2013). This is in contrast to the
frequentist approach, which perceives probability as the frequency of a particular
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event, given repeated sampling. This difference in understanding regarding the
nature of event probability provides the basis for the difference in understanding
regarding parameters between the two approaches. For the frequentist approach,
parameters are understood as unknown but fixed and constant quantities across
samples, which are reflected by a fixed parameter associated with some level of
error due to sampling (StataCorp, 2015; Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014). That is
why repeated random sampling is so important to the frequentist methodologist:
the frequentist analysis answers questions based on the distribution of statistics
from repeated hypothetical samples, which are generated by the same process.
However, a Bayesian analysis seeks to answer questions also based on the
distribution of parameters, but conditional on the observed sample. The Bayesian
approach assumes that the observed data are fixed; the model parameters are
allowed to vary and are treated as random (StataCorp, 2015).
This difference in probability and thus parameters leads to a difference in
reporting statistics and subsequently, results. As noted above and unique to
Bayesian methods, common summaries of location for the posterior distribution
are the mean, median, and mode, and common summaries of variance are the
standard deviation and interquartile range (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin,
1995). The frequentist approach relies on confidence intervals and hypothesis
testing of the model and of parameters. Given that comparisons are oftentimes
made between resulting models of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches, the
Bayesian approach has incorporated its version of these statistics—also using
hypothesis testing and developing posterior probability intervals, the latter of
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which are the counterparts to confidence intervals. The interpretation of the
frequentist 95% confidence interval is that with repeated sampling and
computations of the confidence interval each time, 95% of these intervals will
contain the true value of the parameter. Thus, for any given single confidence
interval, the probability that the true parameter is in that interval is either zero or
one. However, the Bayesian credible interval, or posterior probability interval,
provides a range for a parameter such that the probability that the parameter lies
in that range is 95%, and not zero or one (StataCorp, 2015; van de Schoot et al.,
2013). Regarding hypothesis testing, the frequentist approach answers the
question of how likely are the observed data, given that the null hypothesis is true,
whereas the Bayesian approach answers the question of how likely is the null
hypothesis, given the observed data (StataCorp, 2015).
Methods of Comparison between the Frequentist and Bayesian
Approach to Statistics. Continuing in this vein of comparisons between a classical
approach and the Bayesian approach to statistics, very little work has been done in
terms of formalizing a method of comparison between the two approaches. Most
work on this point takes a very narrow approach; researchers are interested to
know about the comparative utility of each approach but limited to their specific
case. Consequently, many studies have been done that compare the classical
approach to the Bayesian approach, but the method of comparison varies widely
based on research design and variable construction. In spite of the variation,
attempts at a comparison method can be grouped into three main categories: a
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comparison to a known underlying estimate; a comparison in terms of bias; and a
comparison of frequentist confidence intervals to Bayesian credible intervals.
Much work on this topic uses simulations, and studies that make
comparisons to a known underlying estimate fall into this category. These studies
generally first generate a known distribution, reliability estimate, or point
estimate, and then evaluate the closeness of results of the different modeling
approaches to this known estimate (Betti, Cazzaniga, & Tornatore, 2011;
Guikema, 2005). Simulation work is also involved in the second comparison
method. In this comparison method, studies use simulations and generate a known
distribution or estimate. However, instead of providing a simple, direct
comparison to the known estimate, studies that utilize this comparison method
calculate the amount of bias in the models. This generally requires a comparison
to the known estimate; however, it takes the analysis one step further by
evaluating parameter bias, looking at statistical power, or assessing credible
intervals (Bennett, Crowe, Price, Stamey, & Seaman, Jr., 2013; Price, 2012). The
last method of comparison is more straightforward, as it compares frequentist
confidence intervals to Bayesian credible intervals (Liu, Yang, Qiang, Xiao, &
Shi, 2012; Stegmueller, 2013). While simulations have been used, they are not
required for this method as empirical data can provide the necessary points for
comparison. Out of the three methods, this is most likely most direct in situations
involving empirical, or not simulated, data.
While methods of comparison fall generally into these three categories,
some outliers remain. Based on the variable construction, one study utilized kappa
41

scores to compare classifications of hospitals. The kappa scores were used to
show level of agreement between the classical approach and the Bayesian
approach in terms of hospital classification (Austin, Naylor, & Tu, 2000). Another
study made no formal comparison and instead, simply compared results
qualitatively (Coory, Wills, & Barnett, 2009). This illustrates the wide breadth of
methods available to researchers wishing to compare results of the Bayesian and
classical approaches. While this may be good for the researcher in terms of
flexibility and applicability of method, it also is one point within the field where
standardization could occur.
In summary, there are both advantages and disadvantages to the Bayesian
approach to statistics. The inclusion of prior information provides not only more
balanced results (StataCorp, 2015), but also requires reflection on work already
completed in the field (van de Schoot et al., 2013). The Bayesian approach is also
seen as more comprehensive and exact as it utilizes the entire posterior
distribution of model parameters (StataCorp, 2015), resulting in a more direct
expression of uncertainty (van de Schoot et al., 2013). Results are also more
intuitive and straightforward in interpretation (StataCorp, 2015; Stokes, Chen, &
Rubin, 1995; van de Schoot et al., 2013). However, specifying prior information,
given its subjective nature, is seen as controversial by some and increases the
complexity of both computations and the model. Essentially, if one is interested in
repeated-sampling inference regarding parameters, then the frequentist approach
is the more appropriate method. However, if one is interested in the probability
that the parameter of interest belongs to some pre-specified interval, then the
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Bayesian approach is the more appropriate method (StataCorp, 2015). Due to the
nature of elections and the treatment of probability as uncertainty and parameters
as random, this understanding illustrates why Bayesian methods are more
appropriate for the subject at hand than the frequentist approach.
Misconceptions about Indicators of Statistical Significance
In March 2016, the American Statistical Association (ASA) issued a
statement concerning statistical significance and outlined a series of principles to
improve the quality surrounding the conduct and interpretation of statistics,
particularly highlighting the p-value. Many of these statements codified previous
controversial, or at least non-traditional, thoughts concerning the use of p-values
in research. This next section addresses those discussions concerning the
controversy surrounding and misconception of the p-value.
One point of misconception concerning the p-value is its definition. A
correct definition of the p-value is as follows: The p-value represents the
probability of observing data as extreme or more extreme than the data collected,
under an assumption of no effect or that the null hypothesis is true (Goodman,
1999; Wilkinson, 2014). Oftentimes the researcher misconstrues this definition,
potentially due to a misordering of the conditional probability. The p-value
provides the probability of p(D|H0), or the probability of these data, given the null
hypothesis, instead of p(H0|D), or the probability of this hypothesis, given the
observed data. The latter represents what most researchers may wish to conclude,
although that would be incorrect (Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Gill, 1999; Gliner,
Leech, & Morgan, 2002; Gross, 2015; Kirk, 1996). The p-value does not provide
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the probability of either the null or alternative hypothesis being true (Minium,
King, & Bear, 1993). This also coincides with the second principle articulated by
the ASA: “P-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is
true, or the probability that the data were produced by random chance alone”
(American Statistical Association, 2016).
One point of controversy surrounding the p-value is its usefulness as it
relates to the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis can be rejected unless the effect
is exactly zero with a large enough sample or enough statistical power (Gill, 1999;
Gliner, Leech, & Morgan, 2002; Gross, 2015; Kirk, 1996; Meehl, 1978). This
detracts from its usefulness, but also highlights that a ‘statistically significant’
result does not necessarily indicate a meaningful result. The strong emphasis on
p-values has deterred further investigation into more meaningful evaluations of
measurement and has blurred the distinction between p-values and effect sizes
(Gliner, Leech, & Morgan, 2002; Gross, 2015; Rothman, 2014). The ASA
summarized it this way, stating that “statistical significance … does not measure
the size of an effect or the importance of a result” (American Statistical
Association, 2016).
A second point of controversy relates to the arbitrary nature of the
significance level. By setting a fixed level of significance, the researcher turns a
distribution of probability or uncertainty into a dichotomous decision of either
rejecting or failing to reject the null hypothesis (Kirk, 1996). Creating this
dichotomy and this distinction presumes no measurement error, an assumption
that very few social scientists would be willing to defend (Gill, 1999). Treating
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the significance level in this way can also influence conclusions. For example,
presume two researchers obtain identical treatment effects from a set of data;
however, one measures at a significance level of .05, whereas the other measures
at a significance level of 0.01. Different conclusions are drawn concerning the
treatment effect, given the significance level (Kirk, 1996). Furthermore, a small
change in a group mean or a regression coefficient can cause a different
conclusion to be drawn, which is why some advocate measuring the statistical
significance of the difference of two results instead of the difference in
significance levels between two results (Gelman & Stern, 2006). The ASA
highlighted this discrepancy as well, stating that “scientific conclusions and
business or policy decisions should not be based only on whether a p-value passes
a specific threshold” (American Statistical Association, 2016).
Lastly, the implications of these misconceptions surrounding the definition
and use of p-values are great. Using a misconstrued statistic creates a poor
classification system for results, causing researchers to preoccupy themselves
with ‘statistical significance’ and ending ultimately with a publication bias
(Gross, 2015; Rothman, 2014). This focus on significance has also led to a
dichotomous view of relationships that are better handled in quantitative or
probabilistic terms (Rothman, 2014). Furthermore, it undermines and inhibits
progress in the field. Researchers lose incentive to specify more precise
hypotheses and explore competing hypotheses. Likewise, even a fair treatment of
the p-value results in an understanding just as narrow, as it provides no further
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information than what is already known about the state of the world (Gigerenzer,
1998; Gill, 1999).
From this review, the need to bring a new perspective to critical
realignment theory becomes clear. As demonstrated above, current work has only
evaluated critical realignment theory through the classical approach to statistics.
This is concerning given the misconceptions surrounding p-values and the
treatment of probability. However, the Bayesian approach to statistics corrects for
both of these concerns, treating probability as the degree of uncertainty and the
parameters as random. The next section of this discussion turns to the application
of Bayesian modeling to the question of critical realignment theory.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD
To assess if Bayesian methods improve the usefulness of critical
realignment theory in comparison to the frequentist approach, two sets of models
were estimated: one pertaining to the presidential popular vote, and one pertaining
to U.S. House seats. Each set of models was analyzed using both ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression and Bayesian linear regression. The results of these two
statistical approaches were then compared. Analyses relating to the classical
approach utilized SPSS version 24 and analyses relating to the Bayesian approach
utilized SAS 9.3.
Data
Presidential Popular Vote Returns. The data for the first set of models
were taken from a compilation of presidential popular vote returns denoted in
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections. For each general election
between 1828 and 2008, the total number of votes, the number of votes for the
Democratic candidate, the number of votes for the Republican candidate, and the
number of votes for both a third party and a fourth party candidate, respectively,
were collected. Limiting this analysis to the two major political parties, votes for
the third and fourth parties were discarded. This resulted in a sample size of 45
elections.

47

The dependent variable for this analysis was the Democratic two-party
percentage of the presidential vote from 1828 to 2008. While the raw data
collected from the Congressional Quarterly included a variable containing the
percentage of Democratic vote, this percentage accounted for the third and fourth
party voting that occurred. Consequently, the Democratic percentage for the
dependent variable was recalculated to appropriately capture only the two-party
percentage. There was no concern for floor or ceiling effects on the dependent
variable in the presidential analysis or in the congressional analysis as the
dependent variable is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, or as a percentage between
the values of 0 and 100.
The other variables in the model included a set of five dummy variables
and one constant. The set of five dummy variables were coded to identify the five
hypothesized epochs or eras in American electoral history. For example, the first
epoch is hypothesized from 1828 to 1856. Thus, all general elections within and
including the endpoints of that range would be coded as one for the 1828 era
variable, whereas all other general elections are coded as zero. This was done for
all five epochs, resulting in the five dummy-coded era variables. However,
introducing all five of those variables into the model simultaneously would result
in perfect multicollinearity. Consequently, the dummy variable for the era to
which comparisons are being made was excluded from the model. In its place,
however, was a constant, which corresponds to the mean of the dependent
variable for that era. It is this constant that allowed for a comparison to the
excluded era.
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Share of U.S. House Seats. Data for this second set of models were taken
from the Office of the Clerk within the U.S. House of Representatives and the
Historical Statistics of the United States. For each House election between 1828
and 2008, the number of U.S. House seats held by Republicans and Democrats
was gathered. Limiting the analysis to the two major parties, the sum of total seats
was calculated. Then, using this calculated sum, the percentage of U.S. House
seats held by the Democrats was calculated. This two-party percentage of
Democratically-held U.S. House seats was the dependent variable for this set of
models. The sample size for this analysis was 90 congressional elections.
Similar to the presidential popular vote models, the other variables in this
series of models included a set of four dummy variables and one constant.
However, one additional variable was added to the model: a measure of the effect
of a general election running simultaneously with the House election. Campbell
referred to this as the “on-year presidential surge and the midterm decline”
(Campbell, 2006). The variable represented the difference between the
Democratic presidential candidate’s vote percentage and 50 percent. It took a
positive value in the “on year”, or the general election year, and took a negative
value in the midterm cycles. This was to control for the surge and decline effects;
between the on-year and midterm cycle, the midterm decline cancels the on-year
surge.
While these two sets of analyses are similar, one important difference
exists between them. As discussed previously in the literature review and shown
visually in Figure 4, the timing of the epochs differ slightly between the
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congressional analysis and the presidential analysis. The reasons for this have
already been outlined in a previous chapter; mentioning this here is for the coding
of the data. For example, for the fourth presidential epoch spanning general
elections from 1932 to 1960, all general elections within this timeframe and
inclusive of the endpoints, were coded as one. All other general elections, from
1828 to 2008, were coded as zero. For the analysis of the fourth congressional
epoch, all midterm and general elections between 1932 and 1994 inclusive of the
endpoints, were coded as one. All other general and midterm elections between
1828 and 2008 were coded as zero.
One other unique feature of this type of data relates to the formation of the
present-day political parties in the United States. In recent history, mainly two
parties, the Republicans and Democrats, have dominated American politics.
However, while the basic ideals of these parties have not changed over the years,
the names of these parties have. Other labels that have been used with regards to
American political parties and affiliation include Whigs, Democratic Republicans,
National Republicans, among others. However, these names changes are only
relevant for one election within this analysis. For all but the 1912 election, the
largest contenders, in terms of percentage of the total vote, were the Democrats
and Republicans. However, four candidates ran in the 1912 general election:
Woodrow Wilson, representing the Democratic party; Theodore Roosevelt,
representing the Progressive party; William H. Taft representing the Republican
party; and Eugene V. Debs representing the Socialist party. In this particular
election, the largest contenders, in terms of percentage of the total vote, were
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Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (CQ Press, 2010). Thus, to remain
consistent with using the largest two contenders percentage-wise, this election
only compared the Democratic percentage vote to the Progressive percentage
vote. Theoretically, this is appropriate as the Progressive party was understood as
a more active branch of the Republican party (Milkis, 2012).

1828-1856

1860-1892

1828

1896-1928

1932-1960

1964-

1918

1828-1858

1860-1894

1896-1930

2008

1932-1994

1996-

Figure 4. Diagram illustrating the five hypothesized epochs of American electoral
history, specifying elections for the congressional and presidential analyses,
respectively.
Analysis Plan
The analysis plan for the first set of research questions posed in this study
was comprised of three sets of multiple regressions for the analysis of the
presidential popular vote and three sets of regressions for the analysis of the U.S.
House seats. The first set of regressions within each analysis (i.e., either
presidential or congressional) sought to replicate and extende the results found in
Campbell’s 2006 study to illustrate the contribution of classical multiple
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regression to the question of critical elections. The second set of regressions
examined the effect on and influence of Bayesian methods with regard to this
research question, setting up the model similarly to the first set but specifying a
non-informative prior distribution. The third set of regressions mimicked the
second set of regressions, but included an informative prior distribution. Each set
of regressions had four unique regressions within it; this was to individually test
the five different epochs associated with critical elections and realignment theory.
To answer the second set of research questions raised in this study, the
relative strength of the comparison methods discussed in the literature review was
first assessed. From here, the most efficient method was identified and then
applied to the current comparison being made between the frequentist and
Bayesian approaches on the topic of critical realignment theory.
Frequentist Approach. To answer the first research question, which
examines critical realignment theory from the classical statistical approach, a set
of multiple linear regressions was conducted. The full set of regressions evaluates
critical realignment theory as a whole, and each single regression compared one
baseline era to its corresponding comparison era. Given that there are five
hypothesized eras, this resulted in four regressions to test the entire theory.
This procedure had multiple steps. However, before moving forward with
the construction of variables and analysis plan, a power analysis was first
conducted to ensure enough statistical power existed to carry out the analysis.
This is because an underpowered study will cause a true difference in outcomes to
go undetected, and an overpowered study will find a meaningless effect. An
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acceptable range of statistical power is from 0.80 to 0.90 (Adams-Huet & Ahn,
2009).
Second, after meeting the requirement of statistical power, variables were
manipulated as described above, resulting in five predictors in each regression.
Those five predictors include: a constant held to the mean of the dependent
variable for the baseline era, and four dummy-coded variables representing the
remaining four hypothesized eras. Descriptive statistics were also run at this time.
The third step of the process involved checking the assumptions of linear
regression. The assumptions of linear regression include independence of
observations, independence of errors, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity of
residuals, and absence of multicollinearity. Independence of observations implies
that each observation is stand-alone; one observation does not affect another
observation. The independence of observations is generally assessed through an
evaluation of data collection methods. Independence of errors implies noncorrelated errors, and the Durbin-Watson statistic is used to assess this
assumption. Normality is assessed for each variable in the model, and this is done
through kurtosis and skewness statistics. The assumption of linearity speaks to the
type of relationship between each independent and the dependent variable, and is
typically assessed through an evaluation of observed versus predicted values
using scatterplots. Homoscedasticity means constant error variance, and is
assessed by evaluating scatterplots of residuals against predicted values. Lastly,
the absence of multicollinearity means that independent variables are not highly
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correlated with one another, and this is typically assessed through a variance
inflation factor.
After assessing these assumptions, the next step in the process was to run
the models. All variables were entered simultaneously into the model, and for this
analysis, the model took the following form:

𝑦 = 𝛽. + 𝛽0 𝑥0 + 𝛽2 𝑥2 + 𝛽3 𝑥3 + 𝛽4 𝑥4

(3)

where 𝑦 represents the Democratic two-party percentage vote for the given
election, β0 represents the mean of the dependent variable for the baseline era, β1
represents the regression coefficient for the comparison era, x1 represents the
coding of the comparison era, β2 represents the regression coefficient for the first
control era, x2 represents the coding of the first control era, β3 represents the
regression coefficient for the second control era, x3 represents the coding of the
second control era, β4 represents the regression coefficient for the third control
era, and x4 represents the coding of the third control era. As stated previously,
four regressions were run in order to test each baseline era against its
corresponding comparison era.
After running the models, the fifth step in the process was to review the
results and then assess model fit. The F-test was used to assess whether the set of
independent variables collectively predicted the dependent variable; however, the
focus of this study was on the results of the t-tests for the regression coefficients
in addition to the value of coefficients to determine the presence and impact of a
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realignment. Given the constant and the dummy coding of the eras, one era was
tested against the constant at a time. Thus, the resulting coefficient represented the
difference in percentage points of the mean of the dependent variable for the
baseline era and the comparison era. The t-test for this coefficient then indicated
whether the difference is statistically significant. The R2 value was also reported
to assess model fit and evaluate how much variance is accounted for in the model.
Bayesian Approach. After completing this first set of regressions, the
research question was then examined from the perspective of Bayesian methods.
The models carried the same specification as in the classical ordinary least
squares regression, given that a point of interest was to compare the contribution
of each method on the topic of critical realignments.
Several steps also existed in the Bayesian analysis. The first step was to
choose a probability model for the data. This is similar to choosing a data model
in the classical approach. It involves selecting a probability distribution for the
data if the parameters of interest were known. If the assumption is made that
observations are independent and covariates will be included in the model, then a
probability function of the form p(yi | xi,q) would be used, where yi are the data
values to be observed, xi is the covariate information, and q is the vector of
unknown parameters. This can take the form of a Bernoulli distribution or a
normal distribution, for example.
After selecting the data model, the second step in Bayesian analysis was to
select a prior distribution. This distribution represented current knowledge
regarding the unknown parameters prior to data being observed. There are two
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main types of prior distributions: non-informative prior distributions, also referred
to as reference distributions, and informative prior distributions. The noninformative prior distribution is more objective and assigns equal probability to
all values of the parameter. This assumes that no prior knowledge exists regarding
the parameter. This is in contrast to an informative prior distribution, which
assumes some level of knowledge exists about the parameter. This knowledge can
be gained through substantive information known by the researcher performing
the analysis, through eliciting expert opinion, or through meta-analysis. This step
was completed for each unknown parameter. For this particular study, expert
opinion was gathered from a researcher in the field who specializes in critical
realignment theory. Information from this source was translated into a distribution
and used as the prior for the respective parameter.
After selecting the prior distributions, the next step was to observe or
collect the data. These data were used to create the likelihood function, or more
simply, the likelihood. This likelihood is a joint probability function, and treats
the data as fixed quantities. The likelihood is given by:

𝐿 𝜃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑦0 , . . . , 𝑦8 𝜃 =

8
9:0 𝑝(𝑦9

|𝜃)

(4)

where θ represents the unknown parameter, and y represents the observed data.
Applying this likelihood to the example at hand, one might understand it in the
following way: the likelihood of a certain mean difference in the Democratic
two-party percentage between two realignment eras is conditional on the observed
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election returns, which is equal to the probability of such election returns, given a
certain mean difference between realignment eras. This is also equal to the
product of the probability of the observed election returns conditional on a certain
mean difference for all observed data points. This likelihood function assumes
that the data values 𝑦 = (𝑦0 , . . . , 𝑦8 ) were obtained independently.
The fourth step in the process was to create the posterior distribution for
each unknown parameter by combining the prior distribution with the likelihood,
or the data at hand. To do this, Bayes’ theorem was applied:

𝑝 𝜃𝑦 =

%(&)%('|&)
% & %('|&) ;&

=

% & <(&|')
%(')

∝ 𝑝 𝜃 𝐿(𝜃|𝑦)

(5)

where “∝” means “is proportional to”, θ represents the unknown parameter, and y
represents the observed data. This formulation of Bayes’ theorem allows the
reader to see where the prior information is combined with the data at hand. At
the right side of the equation, the likelihood function, 𝐿 𝜃 𝑦 , is multiplied by
𝑝(𝜃), which represents the prior distribution (Glickman & van Dyk, 2007). This
means that the posterior distribution is proportional to the product of the prior
distribution and the likelihood function. Here, the phrase “proportional to” implies
that one must multiply or divide by a normalizing constant that forces the
expression to integrate to one (Feller, 1968; Glickman & van Dyk, 2007). The
computation of the integration is shown toward the left side of (5)
by 𝑝 𝜃 𝑝(𝑦|𝜃) 𝑑𝜃. This integration to a value of one is important because if the
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posterior distribution does not integrate to one, then it is considered an improper
posterior distribution and an inadmissible solution (Gelman, 2014).
The fifth step was to assess the posterior distribution first for convergence
and second for estimates. Since Bayesian inference is dependent upon the
formation of this posterior distribution, convergence of the Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulations was assessed. This is because the stationary distribution of the
Markov chain is the posterior distribution and the lack of convergence means that
the parameter space has not been sufficiently explored. A lack of convergence
leads to inefficiencies in sampling, as any sampling of the distribution would not
approximate the target distribution well. While no one statistic informs the
researcher of convergence, typical tests include the Gelman-Rubin, Geweke, and
Heidelberger-Welch tests. The Gelman-Rubin test diagnostics rely on parallel
chains or simulations to test whether they all converge to the same posterior
distribution (SAS Institute, 2016). The Geweke diagnostic compares means from
two non-overlapping parts of the chain to see if they come from the same
distribution, and the Heidelberger-Welch test calculates a test statistic to test
whether the Markov chain is from a stationary distribution (Lam, 2009). To
measure the mixing of the chain and dependency among chain samples,
correlations between variables and autocorrelation statistics were assessed
(Stokes, Chen, & Gunes, 2014). Traceplots were also visually inspected to see if
bad mixing occurred at any part of the parameter space (Lam, 2009). Given that
the analysis results in a posterior distribution for each model parameter, these
metrics were gathered and are provided for each parameter. After confirming
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appropriate convergence of the chain, estimates were also reported from the
posterior distribution. Typical statistics include the mean, standard deviation, and
the 95% credible intervals (van de Schoot & Depaoli, 2014).
The last step in this process was to conduct a sensitivity analysis. This
type of analysis assesses the degree to which posterior inferences change when
other reasonable probability distributions are used in place of the current prior
distribution. As was mentioned briefly in the literature review, comparative model
fit is assessed by the DIC statistic. The DIC statistic incorporates both goodness
of fit and a penalty term for increasing model complexity. While better model fit
results in a larger likelihood value, this is multiplied by -2 which results in an
overall smaller value for a better fitting model (Berg, Meyer, & Yu, 2012). This is
why the research question was examined with both informative and noninformative prior distributions.
Comparison between the Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches. As
mentioned previously, the second set of research questions was interested in
formalizing a comparison method between the classical approach and the
Bayesian approach to statistics. The first step was to assess the relative strength of
the comparison method, evaluating the method on two main points: its
applicability to different types of data; and information gained from the
comparison, both as it relates to the topic but also to the statistical approach.
These two standards were operationalized through a set of indicators: two
indicators for the first standard of applicability to different types of data; and five
indicators for the second standard of information gained from the comparison.
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The two indicators for the first standard were whether the comparison method
applies to simulated data and empirical data, and the five indicators for the second
standard were as follows: first, whether the comparison method results in a
quantifiable component; second, whether the comparison method highlights the
meaningful significance of the result; third, whether the comparison method
captures the meaning of the approach; fourth, whether the comparison method
applies to different types of studies; and fifth, whether the comparison method
gathers information which allows for a direct comparison between approaches.
After assessing the relative strength by assigning rankings of the comparison
methods in this way, the most efficient, or relatively strongest, method was
selected.
The next step in this process was to then apply the method to the
comparison of critical realignment theory from the classical statistics approach
and the Bayesian approach. While this comparison resulted in some kind of
measure or statistic, the third step in this process was to then evaluate that statistic
for information gained as it relates to critical realignment theory, but also
information gained regarding the two approaches to statistics. This third and last
step sought to answer the latter two research questions pertaining to the field of
research methods and statistics.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
Power Analysis
Prior to running the analysis, a power analysis was conducted for each set
of data. The presidential models tested for the average mean difference between
the baseline era and the comparison era, while controlling for the other three eras.
Consequently, four parameters are estimated in each model. Given four
predictors, an alpha level of .05, power set at the recommended level of .80
(Adams-Huet & Ahn, 2009), and assuming a medium effect size of .30, a sample
size of 45 is required to detect a significant model, F(4, 40) = 2.61. The
congressional models also tested for the average mean difference between the
baseline era and the comparison era, while controlling for the other three eras and
the surge in voting during general election years. Consequently, 5 parameters are
estimated in each model. Given five parameters, an alpha level of .05, power set
at the recommended level of .80 (Adams-Huet & Ahn, 2009), and assuming a
medium effect size of .25, a sample size of 58 is required to detect a significant
model, F(5,52) = 2.39. Power was met in both analyses with a sample size of 45
elections for the presidential analysis, and a sample size of 90 elections for the
congressional analysis.
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Classical Linear Regression Analysis
Presidential Models. Model assumptions were evaluated prior to
interpreting model results. First, the presidential dataset was evaluated for
outlying and influential elections. This investigation was done by utilizing Cook’s
D and residual values. By utilizing the Cook’s D value, two cases, the 1912 and
1956 elections, were identified as influential. Only the 1912 election had a
residual value outside the accepted bounds; consequently, this election was
dropped. After dropping this observation, the regressions were rerun and these
statistics were again evaluated for additional outliers. After adjusting the Cook’s
D value for the change in sample size, three additional elections were considered
to be influential: the 1936 election, the 1956 election, and the 1964 election.
However, only the 1964 election was found to have a residual value outside the
accepted bounds. A decision was made to keep this election in the dataset for the
following reasons: first, the accepted range for residual values is from -2 to 2, and
the residual value of this election was 2.12, only marginally above the cut-off;
second, by dropping the 1912 election, the sample size falls from 46 to 45
elections. Given the power analysis, deleting an additional election would create
an underpowered study to find a medium effect. Lastly, the 1964 election is one
of the elections being tested for a critical realignment. Consequently, it is not
surprising that it might appear as an influential data point. Given these reasons,
the decision was made to retain this election in the dataset.
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After working through an evaluation of influential points, the remaining
assumptions of the model were also evaluated. Independence of observations was
assumed, as presidential vote returns were recorded at the end of each election
and only compiled for this analysis. Autocorrelation was not detected in the
presidential data, as indicated by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.48. Residual
values appeared normally distributed, with a skewness value of -.14 and a kurtosis
value of -.39. A linear model was deemed appropriate through inspection of
scatterplots of the dependent variable against each independent variable, and the
data were found to be homoscedastic by evaluating scatterplots of the residual
values against the predicted values. The aforementioned scatterplots can be found
in Appendix A. Lastly, there was no indication of multicollinearity, as the
tolerance and variance inflation factors fell within accepted bounds.
As previously noted, multiple linear regression analysis was used to
develop a model for comparing mean differences in the Democratic percentage of
the presidential two-party vote across critical realignments in American electoral
history. Basic descriptive statistics and regression coefficients are shown in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Comparing the first era (1828-1856) to the second
era (1860-1892), the mean difference in the Democratic percentage of the
presidential two-party vote was found to be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.057,
t(40) = -2.07, p = 0.045. The model was able to account for 31.3% of the variance
in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote, F(4,40) = 4.55, p = 0.004, R2
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= .31.1 Comparing the second era (1860-1892) to the third era (1896-1928), the
mean difference in the Democratic share of the presidential vote was not found to
be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.052, t(40) = -1.89, p = 0.07. Comparing the
third era (1896-1928) to the fourth era (1932-1960), the mean difference in the
Democratic share of the presidential vote was found to be statistically significant,
𝛽 = 0.096, t(40) = 3.39, p = 0.002. Lastly, comparing the fourth era (1932-1960)
to the fifth era (1964-2008), the mean difference in the Democratic percentage of
the two-party vote was not found to be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.031, t(40) =
-1.20, p = 0.24.
The point estimates provided in both the table below and the text above
indicate the magnitude of mean difference between the eras noted as measured in
percentage points. The sign on the coefficient indicates the direction of the swing
in party dominance, with a negative sign indicating a swing toward the
conservatives, as it indicates that the Democratic percentage of the vote fell.
Likewise, a positive sign on the coefficient indicates a swing toward the liberal
side, indicating an increase in the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote.
The results above support the conclusion of a critical realignment, based upon
statistical significance, in the Republicans’ favor in 1860, corroborated by the
election of Republican President Abraham Lincoln, and the conclusion of a
critical realignment in the Democrats’ favor in 1932, corroborated by the election
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the Democratic Party.
1

These fit statistics are the same for each presidential model within the classical approach, as only
the indicator is changing between runs of the model. Likewise, the sample size, R2, adjusted R2,
the standard error of the estimate, and the Durbin-Watson statistic listed in the table are also
consistent across runs of the model.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Presidential Classical Regression Models
Variables
Democratic Percentage of
Two-Party Presidential Vote
Dummy Variables
1828-1860
1860-1892
1896-1928
1932-1960
1964-2008

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

45

0.49

0.06

45
45
45
45
45

0.18
0.20
0.18
0.18
0.27

0.39
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.45

Table 2
Regression Coefficients for the Presidential Classical Regression Models
Dependent variable: Democratic percentage of two-party vote
All presidential elections except 1912
Dummy
Variables

(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Standard
Error

(3)

(4)

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

0.057*

2.07

0.108***

3.85

0.013

0.45

0.052

1.89

-0.044

-1.60

-0.096*

-3.93

1828-1856

-

1860-1892

-0.057*

-2.07

-

1896-1928

-0.108***

-3.85

-0.052

-1.89

-

1932-1960

-0.013

-0.45

0.044

1.60

0.096**

3.93

-

1964-2008

-0.044

-1.69

0.013

0.53

0.065*

2.52

-0.031

Constant

0.537

0.481

0.429

0.525

45

45

45

45

0.313

0.313

0.313

0.313

0.240

0.240

0.240

0.240

Standard error
of estimate

0.056

0.056

0.056

0.056

Durbin-Watson
statistic

1.480

1.480

1.480

1.480

N
R

2

Adjusted R

2

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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Standard
Error

-1.20

Congressional Models. The results from the congressional data are
addressed next. Similar to the presidential data, the congressional dataset was first
evaluated for outliers. An initial evaluation of Cook’s D and residual values
against the data, using both values as metrics, returned the following elections as
outliers: the 1864 election, the 1866 election, the 1890 election, the 1912 election,
and the 1936 election. Using only a measure of the Cook’s D value added the
elections of 1860 and 1894. Since the 1912 election was found to be an outlier in
the presidential dataset as well, this observation was first deleted and the analysis
was rerun. The other four elections which were found to be influential points
remained as such on both indicators when rerunning the analysis.
On a second evaluation of outliers after the deletion of the election of
1912, the 1866 election, the 1864 election, the 1890 election, and the 1936
election remained as influential points on both indicators as mentioned above. At
this point, the 1866 election carried the highest absolute residual and Cook’s D
values; consequently, this election was deleted next from the dataset to see how
its removal would affect the other outlying points. After its deletion, the elections
of 1864, 1936, and 1890 all remained as influential points as indicated by both
residual and Cook’s D values. The Cook’s D measurement also denoted a series
of other elections as influential points; however, these elections did not carry
residual values above an absolute value of 2. At this point, the election of 1936
carried the highest residual value and so this election was eliminated to measure
the effect on the other outlying points.
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A few additional passes were made through the data, but due to concerns
of overfitting the model, the decision was made to evaluate outlying and
influential points in a different manner. Here, the elections that appeared as
influential during the first evaluation of influential points were dummy coded. A
dummy variable was created in which the supposed outlying elections were coded
as a “1” and all other elections were coded as a “0”. This binary variable was then
entered into the regressions and its coefficient was evaluated for statistical
significance. In the subsequent regressions, this variable was not found to be a
statistically significant predictor, indicating that this group of elections was not
statistically significantly affecting the slope of the regression line. Consequently,
a decision was made to include these elections for two reasons: first, some of the
supposed outlying elections were either located at or near critical juncture points
(i.e., the elections of 1864 and 1936); and second, there was some concern
regarding statistical power if all influential elections were dropped.
Consequently, after this investigation, assumptions were evaluated.
Independence of observations was assumed, as the seat shares were recorded at
the end of each election and only compiled for this analysis. Autocorrelation was
not detected in the presidential data, as indicated by a Durbin-Watson statistic of
1.22. Residual values appeared normally distributed, with a skewness value of .20
and a kurtosis value of .52. A linear model was deemed appropriate through
scatterplots of the dependent variable against each independent variable, and the
data were found to be homoscedastic by evaluating scatterplots of the residual
values against the predicted values. The aforementioned scatterplots can be found
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in Appendix A. Lastly, there was no indication of multicollinearity, as the
tolerance and variance inflation factors fell within accepted bounds.
As noted in previous sections, multiple linear regression analysis was used
to develop a model for comparing mean differences in the Democratic seat share
in the U.S. House across eras of critical realignments in American electoral
history. Basic descriptive statistics and regression coefficients are shown in Table
3 and Table 4. Comparing the first era (1828-1858) to the second era (18601894), the mean difference in the Democratic seat share in the U.S. House of
Representatives was found to be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.112, t(85) = -3.33,
p = 0.001. The model was able to account for 33.6% of the variance in the
Democratic seat share, F(5,85) = 8.61, p < 0.001, R2 = .336.2 Comparing the
second era (1860-1894) to the third era (1896-1930), the mean difference in the
Democratic seat share was not found to be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.019,
t(85) = -0.57, p = 0.57. Comparing the third era (1896-1930) to the fourth era
(1932-1994), the mean difference in the Democratic seat share was found to be
statistically significant, 𝛽 = 0.15, t(85) = 5.19, p < .001. Lastly, comparing the
fourth era (1932-1994) to the fifth era (1996-2008), the mean difference in the
Democratic seat share was found to be statistically significant, 𝛽 = -0.114, t(85) =
-2.80, p < 0.001.
Similar to the presidential models, the point estimates provided both in the
table below and the text above indicate the magnitude of mean difference in
2

Similar to the presidential models, only the indicator is changing between runs of the
congressional model in the classical approach, resulting in consistent fit statistics. This is
applicable as well to the aforementioned statistics in the table detailing regression coefficients for
the congressional model.
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Democratic seat shares in the U.S. House across the specified eras. The sign on
the coefficient carries a similar interpretation to that of the presidential models; a
negative sign indicates a conservative swing as the average percentage of
Democratic seats fell between the two eras, whereas a positive sign indicates the
opposite scenario, with a swing toward the liberal side. The results corroborate the
presidential analysis, as both the 1860 and 1932 congressional elections
demarcated eras of statistically significant mean differences in the Democratic
seat share in the U.S. House from the most previous era, and in the same direction
as found within the presidential analysis. The one outstanding result is the
comparison of the fourth to the fifth era, which did not find statistically significant
results in the presidential analysis, but did find such in the congressional analysis.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Congressional Classical Regression Models

Variables
Democratic Percentage of US House
Seats
Midterm Election Surge
Dummy Variables
1828-1858
1860-1894
1896-1930
1932-1994
1996-2008

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

91
91

0.53
0.79

0.12
11.74

91
91
91
91
91

0.18
0.20
0.20
0.35
0.08

0.38
0.40
0.40
0.48
0.27

Table 4
Regression Coefficients for the Congressional Classical Regression Models
Dependent variable: Democratic percentage of US House seats
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Dummy
Variables

(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Standard
Error

(3)

(4)

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

0.110**

3.33

0.131***
0.019

1828-1858

-

1860-1894

-0.110**

-3.33

1896-1930

-0.130***

-3.87

-0.019

-0.57

-

1932-1994

0.020

0.65

0.131***

4.55

0.150***

1996-2008

-

Coefficient

Standard
Error

3.87

-0.019

-0.65

0.57

-0.131***

-4.55

-0.150***

-5.19

5.19

-

-0.100*

-2.15

0.017

0.39

0.035

0.81

-0.114**

-2.8

Midterm
Election
Surge

-0.001

-1.07

-0.001

-1.07

-0.001

-1.07

-0.001

-1.07

Constant

0.580

0.468

0.449

0.599

N

91

91

91

91

R2

0.336

0.336

0.336

0.336

Adjusted R2

0.297

0.297

0.297

0.297

Standard error
of estimate

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.098

DurbinWatson
statistic

1.221

1.221

1.221

1.221

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001

Bayesian Linear Regression Analysis
Specification of Prior Distributions. For the models employing
informative prior distributions, the prior distributions for the parameters were
assumed to be normal and means and variances were set to the values found in the
table below. The means and variances found below were derived from adjusting
Burnham’s model, as Burnham presupposed an electoral realignment in 1856 and
not 1860 and none after 1932. This particularly complicated the variance
calculations (M.W. Frank, personal communication, September 16, 2016). For the
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models employing non-informative distributions, the default of
“COEFFPRIOR=UNIFORM” within the SAS PROC GENMOD command
statement was utilized, applying a uniform, or equal probability prior, to all
parameters in the model. Code for setting and applying these prior distributions,
in addition to all Bayesian analysis, can be found in Appendix B.
Table 5
Means and Variances for the Informative Prior Distributions for the Presidential
Bayesian Models
Elections
1828-1856
1860-1892
1896-1928
1932-1960
1964-2008

Mean
53.0
48.0
45.0
53.0
50.0

Variance
9.0
2.5
30.0
16.0
12.0

Table 6
Means and Variances for the Informative Prior Distributions for the
Congressional Bayesian Models
Elections
1828-1858
1860-1894
1896-1930
1932-1994
1996-2008

Mean
55.0
50.0
43.0
62.0
55.0

Variance
25.0
30.0
25.0
25.0
25.0

Presidential Models. As previously mentioned, convergence of the Monte
Carlo Markov chains is vital for Bayesian analysis. Convergence of the simulation
draws ideally achieve a stationary distribution, from which inferences regarding
parameters can be made. No one statistic indicates convergence; instead, a series

71

of diagnostics are evaluated first to assess convergence before interpreting
parameters.
For all presidential models, diagnostics provided no evidence that
convergence was not achieved. The Gelman-Rubin test, which uses parallel
chains with differing initial values to test whether they all converge to the same
target distribution, returned similar estimates for each model (i.e., each noninformative model and each informative model) indicating one stationary
distribution, respectively. The Geweke test is similar, but evaluates convergence
by comparing means from the early and later parts of the Markov chain.
Statistically significant results indicate a significant difference in the means,
implying a lack of convergence to one stationary distribution. This test returned
non-significant results for each presidential model. Visual analysis of the trace
plots indicated sufficient burn-in and adequate mixing of the chain. Adequate
mixing of the chain was also supported by the autocorrelation graphs and the
effective sample size; correlations were low among lagged points and the
effective sample size matched precisely the number of Monte Carlo simulations.
The Markov chain was deemed long enough through the Heidelberger-Welch test,
and accuracy of the percentiles is high, as indicated by the Raftery-Lewis test.
This was supported by a dependence factor close to one. Tables detailing these
specifics are provided below and the trace plots and posterior distributions for
each parameter are provided in Appendix B.
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Table 7
Convergence Diagnostics for the Presidential Bayesian Models Using a NonInformative Prior Distribution
Diagnostic
Statistics
GelmanRubin

Geweke

Autocorrel
ation
statistics

Explanation
of Test

Accepted
Bounds

Uses parallel
chains with
differing
initial values
to assess
convergence
to same
distribution.
Failure to do
so could
indicate a
multi-mode
posterior
distribution.
Compares
means from
early and later
parts of
Markov
chain.
Measures
dependency
among chain
samples.

This is
measured
by the ratio
of withinchain and
betweenchain
variance. A
value close
to 1 is
considered
adequate.

Effective
Sample
Size

Similar to
autocorrelatio
n; measures
mixing of the
chain.

Heidelberg
er-Welch

Ensures
adequate
length of the
chain.
Evaluates the
accuracy of
the desired
percentiles by
reporting the
number of
samples
needed.
Failure could
indicate the
need for a
longer chain.

RaffertyLewis

Model 1:
Comparing
1828-1856 to
1860-1892
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Model 2:
Comparing
1860-1892 to
1896-1928
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Model 3:
Comparing
1896-1928 to
1932-1960
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Model 4:
Comparing
1932-1960 to
1964-2008
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.

Lowest p-value
is 0.5590

Lowest p-value
is 0.5701

Lowest p-value
is 0.5701

Lowest p-value
is 0.5681

Low
correlation
between
lagged
points
indicates
adequate
mixing.
Low
discrepancy
between the
effective
sample size
and the
simulation
sample size
indicates
adequate
mixing.
Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.
The
resulting
dependence
factor
should be
close to 1.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Effective
sample size is
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size is
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size is
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size is
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Lowest p-value
is 0.1900

Lowest p-value
is 0.1800

Lowest p-value
is 0.1800

Lowest p-value
is 0.1864

Dependence
factors range
from 0.9904 to
1.0406

Dependence
factors range
from 0.9904 to
1.0406

Dependence
factors range
from 0.9904 to
1.0406

Dependence
factors range
from 0.9904 to
1.0406
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*Further mixing of the Markov chains and
adequate burn-in are evaluated visually and
are presented in the appendix.
**Table adapted from
https://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63347/HT
ML/default/viewer.htm#statug_introbayes_sect008.htm#statug.i
ntrobayes.bayesess

Table 8
Convergence Diagnostics for the Presidential Bayesian Models Using an
Informative Prior Distribution
Diagnostic
Statistics
GelmanRubin

Geweke

Autocorrelatio
n statistics

Effective
Sample Size

Explanation
of Test

Accepted
Bounds

Uses parallel
chains with
differing
initial values
to assess
convergence
to same
distribution.
Failure to do
so could
indicate a
multi-mode
posterior
distribution.
Compares
means from
early and
later parts of
Markov
chain.
Measures
dependency
among chain
samples.

This is
measured
by the
ratio of
withinchain and
betweenchain
variance.
A value
close to 1
is
considered
adequate.
Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.

Similar to
autocorrelati
on; measures
mixing of
the chain.

Low
correlation
between
lagged
points
indicates
adequate
mixing,
demonstrat
ed
graphically
.
Low
discrepanc
y between
the
effective
sample
size and
the
simulation
sample
size
indicates
adequate
mixing.

Model 1:
Comparing
1828-1856 to
1860-1892
Values range
from 1.0001 to
1.0005

Model 2:
Comparing
1860-1892 to
1896-1928
Values range
from 1.0000 to
1.0005

Model 3:
Comparing
1896-1928 to
1932-1960
Values range
from 1.0001 to
1.0007

Model 4:
Comparing
1932-1960 to
1964-2008
Values range
from 1.0001 to
1.0007

Lowest p-value
is 0.1603

Lowest p-value
is 0.1732

Lowest p-value
is 0.1745

Lowest p-value
is 0.1553

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Refer to graphs
in appendix.

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,653.10 to
10,268.30;
simulation
sample size is
10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,653.10 to
10,268.30;
simulation
sample size is
10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,653.10 to
10,268.30;
simulation
sample size is
10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,653.10 to
10,268.30;
simulation
sample size is
10,000
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HeidelbergerWelch

RaffertyLewis

Ensures
adequate
length of the
chain.

Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.

Lowest p-value
is 0.0771;
however, the
sample passed
the stationary
test.
Values range
from 0.9586 to
1.0320

Evaluates
The
the accuracy
resulting
of the
dependenc
desired
e factor
percentiles
should be
by reporting
close to 1.
the number
of samples
needed.
Failure
could
indicate the
need for a
longer chain.
*Further mixing of the Markov chains and
adequate burn-in are evaluated visually and
are presented in the appendix.
**Table adapted from
https://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63347/HT
ML/default/viewer.htm#statug_introbayes_sect008.htm#statug.i
ntrobayes.bayesess

Lowest p-value
is 0.0685;
however, the
sample passed
the stationary
test.
Values range
from 0.9586 to
1.0320

Lowest p-value
is 0.0723;
however, the
sample passed
the stationary
test.
Values range
from 0.9744 to
1.0844

Lowest p-value
is 0.0767;
however, the
sample passed
the stationary
test.
Values range
from 0.9744 to
1.0755

Since these diagnostics did not reveal any concern with the convergence
of the chains, the stationary distributions can be interpreted for parameter
estimates. Tables 9 through 16 below summarize the prior and posterior moments
of the parameters of each of the models as well as the Deviance Information
Criteria (DIC) statistic for each model, which provides a measure of comparative
model fit. A comparison of the DIC statistic suggests that the informative model
is a better fit when evaluating the first era (1828-1856) to the second era (18601892), although the difference in the DIC statistic is small. Consequently, using
the informative model, the posterior mean for this difference is -0.052, with a
standard deviation of 0.031. Theoretically, this posterior mean indicates that the
average Democratic share of the presidential vote fell by 5.22 percentage points
from the first to the second era, 1828-1856 to 1860-1892 respectively.
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Since model parameters are regarded as random estimates in Bayesian
analysis, the conditional probability of parameters carrying a directional effect,
given the data, must be estimated from the posterior distribution samples. For
example, if one was interested in whether a beta coefficient carried a positive
effect on an outcome, one would estimate the conditional probability that the beta
coefficient was greater than zero, drawing from the posterior distribution samples.
However, in this case, the significance of the covariate is not whether it is greater
than zero, but whether it is greater than the average change in Democratic percent
of the presidential vote across all U.S. elections. If the average change within the
era is significantly greater or lesser than the average change across all U.S.
elections, then one may be able to conclude the occurrence of realignment.
Consequently, there is a 0.42 probability of the mean difference between the first
and second era being greater than the overall average change in the Democratic
share of the presidential popular vote.
Comparing the second (1860-1892) era to the third (1896-1928) era for the
presidential data, the DIC statistic indicated slightly better model fit for the
informative model. The posterior distribution for this difference had a mean of 0.028 with a standard deviation of 0.03. This means that the average Democratic
share of the presidential vote fell 2.81 percentage points from the second era to
the third era. However, there is only a 0.16 probability that the mean difference
for this comparison is greater than the overall average change in the Democratic
share of the presidential popular vote.
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Comparing the third (1896-1928) era to the fourth (1932-1960) era, again
the DIC statistic indicated slightly better model fit for the informative model. The
posterior distribution indicated a mean of 0.089 with a standard deviation of 0.03.
This means that the average Democratic vote share rose 8.97 percentage points
between the third and fourth eras. There is a 0.85 probability, though, that this
average mean difference for this comparison is greater than the overall average
change in the Democratic share of the presidential popular vote.
Lastly, comparing the fourth (1932-196) era to the fifth (1960-2008) era,
the DIC statistic indicated slightly better model fit for the non-informative model.
This posterior distribution had a mean of -0.031 and a standard deviation of 0.029.
This means that the average Democratic vote share fell 3.05 percentage points
between the fourth and fifth eras; however, there is a 0.17 probability that this
mean difference is greater than the average change in the Democratic vote share
of the presidential popular vote.

Table 9
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the First and Second Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

-

-

-

-

-

-

1860-1892

0

1.00E-06

-0.0566

0.0302

(-0.1156, 0.0035)

(-0.1172, 0.0013)

1896-1928

0

1.00E-06

-0.0887

0.0305

(-0.1487, -0.0288)

(-0.1477, -0.0280)

1932-1964

0

1.00E-06

-0.0128

0.0316

(-0.0749, 0.0494)

(-0.0730, 0.0509)

1964-2008

0

1.00E-06

-0.0433

0.0286

(-0.0996, 0.0125)

(-0.1011, 0.0107)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5373

0.0220

(0.4940, 0.5798)

(0.4950, 0.5806)

DIC: -118.833
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Table 10
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the First and Second Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

-

-

-

-

-

-

1860-1892

48.00

0.40

-0.0522

0.0306

(-0.1114, 0.0080)

(-0.1132, 0.0060)

1896-1928

45.00

0.03

-0.0843

0.0306

(-0.1442, -0.0235)

(-0.1472, -0.0271)

1932-1964

53.00

0.06

-0.0072

0.0315

(-0.0684, 0.0564)

(-0.0675, 0.0571)

1964-2008

50.00

0.08

-0.0382

0.0287

(-0.0948, 0.0188)

(-0.0952, 0.0177)

0

1.00E-06

0.5333

0.0221

(0.4898, 0.5771)

(0.4885, 0.5753)

Constant
DIC: -119.334

Table 11
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Second and Third Eras
Prior Information

1828-1860

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

0

1.00E-06

0.0567

0.0302

(-0.0023, 0.1168)

(-0.0040, 0.1145)

1860-1892

-

-

-

-

-

-

1896-1928

0

1.00E-06

-0.0321

0.0296

(-0.0904, 0.0260)

(-0.0908, 0.0256)

1932-1964

0

1.00E-06

0.0539

0.0307

(-0.0166, 0.1041)

(-0.0146, 0.1058)

1964-2008

0

1.00E-06

0.0133

0.0277

(-0.0410, 0.0676)

(-0.0418, 0.0667)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4807

0.0207

(0.4396, 0.5207)

(0.4412, 0.5218)

DIC: -118.833

Table 12
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Second and Third Eras
Prior Information

1828-1860

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

53.00

0.11

0.0606

0.0306

(0.0014, 0.1208)

(-0.0004, 0.1187)
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1860-1892

-

-

-

-

-

-

1896-1928

45.00

0.03

-0.0281

0.0297

(-0.0859, 0.0308)

(-0.0859, 0.0307)

1932-1964

53.00

0.06

0.0490

0.0306

(-0.0109, 0.1112)

(-0.0116, 0.1093)

1964-2008

50.00

0.08

0.0180

0.0277

(-0.0368, 0.0731)

(-0.0378, 0.0717)

0

1.00E-06

0.4772

0.0208

(0.4358, 0.5186)

(0.4339, 0.5158)

Constant
DIC: -119.337

Table 13
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Third and Fourth Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

0

1.00E-06

0.0889

0.0302

(0.0299, 0.1490)

(0.0282, 0.1468)

1860-1892

0

1.00E-06

0.0323

0.0296

(-0.0260, 0.0904)

(-0.0263, 0.0900)

1896-1928

-

-

-

-

-

-

1932-1964

0

1.00E-06

0.0761

0.0307

(0.0157, 0.1363)

(0.0176, 0.1380)

1964-2008

0

1.00E-06

0.0455

0.0277

(-0.0088, 0.0999)

(-0.0096, 0.0989)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4485

0.0207

(0.4074, 0.4885)

(0.4090, 0.4896)

DIC: -118.833

Table 14
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Third and Fourth Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

53.00

0.11

0.1012

0.0308

(0.0420, 0.1625)

(0.0418, 0.1621)

1860-1892

48.00

0.40

0.0530

0.0303

(-0.0049, 0.1140)

(-0.0051, 0.1136)

1896-1928

-

-

-

-

-

-

1932-1964

53.00

0.06

0.0897

0.0309

(0.0297, 0.1529)

(0.0280, 0.1505)

1964-2008

50.00

0.08

0.0586

0.0281

(0.0041, 0.1149)

(0.0023, 0.1127)

0

1.00E-06

0.4366

0.0211

(0.3938, 0.4778)

(0.3930, 0.4763)

Constant
DIC: -118.872
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Table 15
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Fourth and Fifth Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

0

1.00E-06

0.0128

0.0311

(-0.0479, 0.0746)

(-0.0496, 0.0723)

1860-1892

0

1.00E-06

-0.0438

0.0305

(-0.1039, 0.0162)

(-0.1026, 0.0170)

1896-1928

0

1.00E-06

-0.0761

0.0306

(-0.1365, -0.0155)

(-0.1369, -0.0165)

1932-1964

-

-

-

-

-

-

1964-2008

0

1.00E-06

-0.0305

0.0286

(-0.0869, 0.0252)

(-0.0885, 0.0234)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5246

0.0220

(0.4812, 0.5670)

(0.4830, 0.5685)

DIC: -118.833

Table 16
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Presidential Models, Comparing the Fourth and Fifth Eras
Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1860

53.00

0.11

0.0257

0.0317

(-0.0352, 0.0886)

(-0.0355, 0.0883)

1860-1892

48.00

0.40

-0.0225

0.0312

(-0.0825, 0.0404)

(-0.0830, 0.0395)

1896-1928

45.00

0.03

-0.0628

0.0309

(-0.1228, 0.0002)

(-0.1235, -0.0011)

1932-1964

-

-

-

-

-

-

1964-2008

50.00

0.08

-0.0171

0.0291

(-0.0737, 0.0409)

(-0.0739, 0.0403)

0

1.00E-06

0.5121

0.0224

(0.4671, 0.5557)

(0.4684, 0.5568)

Constant
DIC: -118.798

Congressional Models. Similar to the presidential models, diagnostics
provided no evidence that convergence was not achieved in the congressional
models using either a non-informative or informative prior distribution. The
Gelman-Rubin test returned similar estimates, again indicating one stationary
distribution. Mean differences between the early and later parts of the Markov
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chain were not found to be statistically significant by the Geweke test, and visual
analysis of the trace plots indicated sufficient burn-in and adequate mixing.
Autocorrelation statistics and the effective sample size also indicated adequate
mixing of the chain; similar to the presidential models, correlations were low
among lagged points and the effective sample size matched the number of Monte
Carlo simulations. The Heidelberger-Welch test concluded that a longer Markov
chain was not needed, and accuracy of the percentiles was found to be within
.005, as indicated by the Raftery-Lewis test. Again, tables detailing these specifics
are provided below and the trace plots and posterior distributions for each
parameter are provided in Appendix B.
Table 17
Convergence Diagnostics for the Congressional Bayesian Models Using a NonInformative Prior Distribution
Diagnostic
Statistics
GelmanRubin

Geweke

Autocorrelat
ion statistics

Explanation
of Test

Accepted
Bounds

Model 1:
Comparing
1828-1858 to
1860-1894
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0002

Model 2:
Comparing
1860-1894 to
1896-1930
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0002

Model 3:
Comparing
1896-1930 to
1932-1994
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0002

Model 4:
Comparing
1932-1994 to
1996-2008
Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Uses parallel
chains with
differing
initial values
to assess
convergence
to same
distribution.
Failure to do
so could
indicate a
multi-mode
posterior
distribution.
Compares
means from
early and
later parts of
Markov
chain.
Measures
dependency
among chain
samples.

This is
measured
by the ratio
of withinchain and
betweenchain
variance.
A value
close to 1
is
considered
adequate.
Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.

Lowest p-value
is 0.2791

Lowest p-value
is 0.2791

Lowest p-value
is 0.2791

Lowest p-value
is 0.2791

Low
correlation
between
lagged
points
indicates

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix
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adequate
mixing.
Effective
Sample Size

Similar to
autocorrelati
on; measures
mixing of the
chain.

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,042.50 to
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,042.50 to
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,042.50 to
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Ensures
Lowest p-value
Lowest p-value
adequate
is 0.2736
is 0.2677
length of the
chain.
RaffertyEvaluates the
Values range
Values range
Lewis
accuracy of
from 0.9744 to
from 0.9744 to
the desired
1.0235
1.0406
percentiles
by reporting
the number
of samples
needed.
Failure could
indicate the
need for a
longer chain.
*Further mixing of the Markov chains and
adequate burn-in are evaluated visually and
are presented in the appendix.
**Table adapted from
https://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63347/HTML/default/viewer.
htm#statug_introbayes_sect008.htm#statug.introbayes.bayesess

Lowest p-value
is 0.2683

Lowest p-value
is 0.1835

Values range
from 0.9744 to
1.0406

Values range
from 0.9664 to
1.0235

Heidelberge
r-Welch

Low
discrepanc
y between
the
effective
sample
size and
the
simulation
sample
size
indicates
adequate
mixing.
Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.
The
resulting
dependenc
e factor
should be
close to 1.

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,042.50 to
10,000;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Table 18
Convergence Diagnostics for the Congressional Bayesian Models Using an
Informative Prior Distribution
Diagnostic
Statistics

Explanation of
Test

Accepted
Bounds

Model 1:
Comparing
1828-1858 to
1860-1894

Model 2:
Comparing
1860-1894 to
1896-1930

Model 3:
Comparing
1896-1930 to
1932-1994

Model 4:
Comparing
1932-1994 to
1996-2008

GelmanRubin

Uses parallel
chains with
differing initial
values to
assess
convergence to
same
distribution.
Failure to do
so could
indicate a
multi-mode
posterior
distribution.

This is
measured
by the ratio
of withinchain and
betweenchain
variance.
A value
close to 1
is
considered
adequate.

Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0003

Values range
from 0.9999 to
1.0004

82

Compares
means from
early and later
parts of
Markov chain.

Geweke

Autocorrel
ation
statistics

Effective
Sample
Size

Measures
dependency
among chain
samples.

Similar to
autocorrelation
; measures
mixing of the
chain.

Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.
Low
correlation
between
lagged
points
indicates
adequate
mixing,
demonstrat
ed
graphically
.
Low
discrepanc
y between
the
effective
sample
size and
the
simulation
sample
size
indicates
adequate
mixing.
Small pvalues
indicate
rejection.

Lowest p-value
is 0.0945

Lowest p-value
is 0.0947

Lowest p-value
is 0.0948

Lowest p-value
is 0.0964

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Refer to graphs
in the appendix

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,674.10 to
10,218.20;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,674.10 to
10,218.20;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,674.10 to
10,218.20;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Effective
sample size
ranged from
9,674.10 to
10,218.20;
simulation
sample size
equaled 10,000

Lowest p-value
is 0.4461

Lowest p-value
is 0.4469

Values range
from 0.9744 to
1.0152

Values range
from 0.9744 to
1.0320

Ensures
adequate
Lowest p-value
Lowest p-value
length of the
is 0.4462
is 0.4462
chain.
Evaluates the
accuracy of the
desired
The
percentiles by
resulting
reporting the
Values range
Values range
Raffertydependenc
number of
from 0.9744 to
from 0.9744 to
Lewis
e factor
samples
1.0152
1.0152
should be
needed. Failure
close to 1.
could indicate
the need for a
longer chain.
*Further mixing of the Markov chains and
adequate burn-in are evaluated visually and
are presented in the appendix.
**NOTE: Table adapted from
https://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63347/HTML/default/viewer.
htm#statug_introbayes_sect008.htm#statug.introbayes.bayesess
Heidelber
ger-Welch

Since these diagnostics did not indicate any issue with the convergence of
the chains, the stationary distributions can be interpreted for parameter estimates.
Similar to the presidential data, Tables 19 through 26 below summarize the prior
and posterior moments of the parameters of each of the models. The DIC statistic
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is also provided, as it measures comparative model fit. Although the difference in
the DIC statistic is small, the DIC statistic suggests that the informative model
provides better model fit when evaluating the first era (1828-1858) to the second
era (1860-1894). Consequently, using the informative model, the posterior mean
for this difference is -0.108, with a standard deviation of 0.03. Theoretically, this
posterior mean indicates that the average Democratic share of seats in the U.S.
House of Representatives fell by 10.75 percentage points from the first to the
second era, 1828-1858 to 1860-1894 respectively. As before, this was compared
to the average Democratic seat share across all U.S. elections, and there is a .77
probability that this difference is greater than the average change in Democratic
seat share.
Comparing the second (1860-1894) era to the third (1896-1930) era, again,
the DIC statistic was slightly smaller for the informative model. The mean of this
posterior distribution was -0.014 with a standard deviation of 0.03. This means
that the average Democratic seat share in the U.S. House fell by 1.36 percentage
points between the second and third eras. There is a .02 probability that this
difference is greater than the average change in Democratic seat shares across all
U.S. elections.
Comparing the third (1896-1930) era to the fourth (1932-1994) era, the
DIC statistic indicated slightly better model fit for the informative model. The
posterior mean of this distribution had a value of 0.15 with a standard deviation of
0.03. This means that the average Democratic seat share in the U.S. House grew
by 15.48 percentage points between the third and fourth eras. There is a 0.99
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probability that this change is greater than the average change in the Democratic
seat share.
Lastly, comparing the non-informative and the informative models for the
comparison between the fourth (1932-1994) era and the fifth (1996-2008) era, the
DIC statistic indicated slightly better model fit for the informative model. The
mean of this posterior distribution carried a value of -0.1088 with a standard
deviation of 0.04. This indicates that the average change fell by 10.88 percentage
points between the fourth and fifth eras, and there is a 0.74 probability that this
change exceeds the average change in Democratic seat shares across all U.S.
elections.
Table 19
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the First and Second Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

-

-

-

-

-

-

1860-1894

0

1.00E-06

-0.1119

0.0342

(-0.1787, -0.0441)

(-0.1756, -0.0421)

1896-1930

0

1.00E-06

-0.1308

0.0342

(-0.1982, -0.0648)

(-0.1982, -0.0649)

1932-1994

0

1.00E-06

0.0192

0.0303

(-0.0398, 0.0787)

(-0.0392, 0.0790)

1996-2008

0

1.00E-06

-0.0952

0.0449

(-0.1844, -0.0076)

(-0.1833, -0.0068)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0009

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0009)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5799

0.0248

(0.5314, 0.6278)

(0.5308, 0.6268)

DIC: -156.671

Table 20
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the First and Second Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information
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Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

-

-

-

-

-

-

1860-1894

50.00

0.03

-0.1075

0.0343

(-0.1742, -0.0395)

(-0.1675, -0.0422)

1896-1930

43.00

0.04

-0.1251

0.0341

(-0.1924, -0.0577)

(-0.1925, -0.0578)

1932-1994

62.00

0.04

0.0247

0.0306

(-0.0348, 0.0848)

(-0.0344, 0.0852)

1996-2008

55.00

0.04

-0.0840

0.0450

(-0.1715, 0.0050)

(-0.1704, 0.0057)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0010

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5752

0.0249

(0.5256, 0.6232)

(0.5273, 0.6246)

DIC: -156.865

Table 21
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Second and Third Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

0

1.00E-06

0.1120

0.0342

(0.0451, 0.1797)

(0.0482, 0.1818)

1860-1894

-

-

-

-

-

-

1896-1930

0

1.00E-06

-0.0189

0.0331

(-0.0845, 0.0453)

(-0.0860, 0.0434)

1932-1994

0

1.00E-06

0.1312

0.0292

(0.0745, 0.1882)

(0.0745, 0.1882)

1996-2008

0

1.00E-06

0.0167

0.0442

(-0.0713, 0.1027)

(-0.0718, 0.1020)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0009

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0009)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4680

0.0234

(0.4219, 0.5131)

(0.4205, 0.5114)

DIC: -156.671

Table 22
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Second and Third Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

55.00

0.04

0.1159

0.0343

(0.0491, 0.1837)

(0.0482, 0.1823)

1860-1894

-

-

-

-

-

-

1896-1930

43.00

0.04

-0.0136

0.0330

(-0.0785, 0.0518)

(-0.0775, 0.0524)

1932-1994

62.00

0.04

0.1362

0.0294

(0.0789, 0.1940)

(0.0797, 0.1947)
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1996-2008

55.00

0.04

0.0274

0.0442

(-0.0586, 0.1155)

(-0.0592, 0.1143)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0010

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4637

0.0235

(0.4168, 0.5090)

(0.4161, 0.5078)

DIC: -156.868

Table 23
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Third and Fourth Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

0

1.00E-06

0.1305

0.0342

(0.0636, 0.1984)

(0.0667, 0.2005)

1860-1894

0

1.00E-06

0.0183

0.0331

(-0.0472, 0.0824)

(-0.0474, 0.0820)

1896-1930

-

-

-

-

-

-

1932-1994

0

1.00E-06

0.1497

0.0292

(0.0930, 0.2069)

(0.0931, 0.2069)

1996-2008

0

1.00E-06

0.0353

0.0442

(-0.0528, 0.1213)

(-0.0533, 0.1207)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0010

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0009)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4494

0.0235

(0.4031, 0.4947)

(0.4022, 0.4934)

DIC: -156.671

Table 24
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Third and Fourth Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

55.00

0.04

0.1344

0.0344

(0.0675, 0.2024)

(0.0666, 0.2010)

1860-1894

50.00

0.03

0.0234

0.0330

(-0.0415, 0.0887)

(-0.0407, 0.0893)

1896-1930

-

-

-

-

-

-

1932-1994

62.00

0.04

0.1548

0.0294

(0.0974, 0.2127)

(0.0983, 0.2134)

1996-2008

55.00

0.04

0.0460

0.0442

(-0.0400, 0.1341)

(-0.0408, 0.1327)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0009

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0009)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4452

0.0235

(0.3982, 0.4906)

(0.3973, 0.4893)

DIC: -156.869
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Table 25
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Non-Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Fourth and Fifth Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

0

1.00E-06

-0.0193

0.0304

(-0.0788, 0.0410)

(-0.0761, 0.0429)

1860-1894

0

1.00E-06

-0.1316

0.0292

(-0.1893, -0.0744)

(-0.1915, -0.0771)

1896-1930

0

1.00E-06

-0.1500

0.0291

(-0.2069, -0.0924)

(-0.2062, -0.0920)

1932-1994

-

-

-

-

-

-

1996-2008

0

1.00E-06

-0.1145

0.0413

(-0.1962, -0.0340)

(-0.1960, -0.0339)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0009

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0026, 0.0009)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5993

0.0175

(0.5649, 0.6327)

(0.5652, 0.6328)

DIC: -156.671

Table 26
Prior and Posterior Distribution Information for the Informative Bayesian
Congressional Models, Comparing the Fourth and Fifth Eras
Election Years

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density Interval

1828-1858

55.00

0.04

-0.0178

0.0306

(-0.0772, 0.0425)

(-0.0786, 0.0407)

1860-1894

50.00

0.03

-0.1288

0.0291

(-0.1862, -0.0711)

(-0.1872, -0.0728)

1896-1930

43.00

0.04

-0.1466

0.0292

(-0.2038, -0.0888)

(-0.2044, -0.0900)

1932-1994

-

-

-

-

-

-

1996-2008

55.00

0.04

-0.1088

0.0413

(-0.1894, -0.0264)

(-0.1910, -0.0287)

General
Election Surge

0

1.00E-06

-0.0010

0.0009

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

(-0.0027, 0.0008)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5974

0.0175

(0.5626, 0.6310)

(0.5639, 0.6316)

DIC: -156.91

Sensitivity Analysis. A sensitivity analysis was also run to assess the
robustness of both the non-informative and informative presidential and
congressional models. This is done by assuming a second prior distribution for
each parameter. Given the model adjustments noted by the expert opinion and its
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potential influence on variance, the means were held constant and the variances
were set to the informative prior values to investigate this effect. The results of
this analysis are shown in Appendix C.
Looking at the presidential models, the DIC statistic indicated slightly
better model fit for this alternative set of models, but the difference in the DIC
statistic was small. Changes in the mean of the posterior distribution were
contained to less than 0.005 for all but one; the outlier was the comparison
between the third and fourth eras, where the informative model returned a mean
estimate of 0.089 and the alternative model returned an estimate of 0.076. The
DIC statistics were -118.87 and -119.38, respectively.
The congressional models returned similar results, with the alternative
models demonstrating slightly better model fit. However, differences between all
mean comparisons across the two sets of models remained within 0.005.
Practically, this translates to half of a percentage point. This result, and the
closeness of the DIC statistic, demonstrates the robustness of the informative
model results for both sets of data.
Formal Comparison
This next section addresses the formal comparison between the classical
and Bayesian statistical approaches. To aid in understanding, some definitions are
provided. There are three parts to this comparison: first, the five methods of
comparison that are noted in the literature review are used in an attempt to
compare the classical and Bayesian approaches to statistics. These five methods
will be referred to as the “comparison methods.” Second, two standards were
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developed for the purpose of the comparison: the first one relating to types of
data, and the second one relating to information gained from the comparison.
These will be referred to as “standards.” Third, to clarify and operationalize the
standards, the standards are broken down into indicators. The first standard has
two indicators, and the second standard has five indicators. Overall, each of the
five comparison methods was measured against all seven indicators. A table
detailing this information follows the text to help clarify this formulation.
As mentioned previously, the literature discusses five comparison methods
for comparing the classical and Bayesian approach to statistics: a comparison to
an underlying known estimate, a comparison in terms of bias, a comparison of
frequentist confidence intervals to Bayesian credible intervals, a comparison done
through kappa scores, and a qualitative comparison. As outlined in the methods
section, each one of these comparison methods was measured against two
standards: the general applicability of the method, and as well as a comparison of
the information gained from the method. From this, a rank was assigned to each
comparison method through a point system and the top ranked method applied to
the case at hand.
This next section further explains the standards utilized, followed by an
evaluation of the different comparison methods against these standards. Lastly,
the top ranked method was applied to the case at hand.
Explanation of Standards. The first standard that the comparison method
was measured against was whether the method is applicable to different types of
data. Since Bayesian methods utilize simulated data at times, this is an important
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consideration concerning the applicability of the method to the social sciences,
and for this study in particular. Types of data were grouped into two main groups:
empirical and simulated. If the method is applicable to both, the comparison
method received two points. Otherwise, one point was awarded for the type of
data to which the comparison method applies.
This second standard is focused particularly on information gained from
the comparison method, but operationalized through five indicators: first, whether
the comparison method resulted in a quantifiable component; second, whether the
comparison method carried a component by which to determine the meaningful
significance of the result; third, whether the comparison method captures the
meaning of the model or statistical approach; fourth, whether the comparison
method carries application to different types of studies, which is to be
differentiated from the different types of data mentioned in the first standard; and
fifth, whether information that allows a direct comparison is gained.
Evaluation of Comparison Methods. As mentioned by Betti, Cazzaniga,
and Tornatore (2011) and Guikema (2005), one way to compare the effectiveness
of the two statistical approaches is to compare each approach to an underlying
known estimate. However, using known estimates limits the data type to
simulations, and consequently, resulted in the comparison method receiving only
one point on the first standard. Regarding the indicators for the second standard,
this comparison method met four of the five indicators. This comparison method
resulted in a quantifiable component, namely the distance from the resulting point
estimate to the known point estimate (though not a true underlying value), and
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this measure of distance can be used to differentiate results and thus produce
some level of meaningful significance concerning the results. This comparison
method also captured the meaning of each statistical approach, as it measures
distance from a resulting point estimate or the mean of a distribution to the known
underlying point estimate. It also resulted in congruent information across
statistical approaches, as the unit of measurement is distance and this can be
compared across approaches. However, this comparison method did not meet the
fourth indicator of applicability across different types of studies, as it does not
work when the underlying point estimate is not known.
Bennett, Crowe, Price, Stamey, and Seaman, Jr. (2013) and Price (2012)
built on the first comparison method, describing a comparison method in which
the amount of bias present in the model parameters is calculated. As this
comparison method is also based on a known underlying value, it only works with
simulated data. With regard to the second standard, this comparison method met
three out of the five indicators. Since the outcome of this comparison method
would be the amount of bias present in model parameters, this method resulted in
a quantifiable component that provides a level of meaningful significance to the
result. This comparison method also reflected the meaning of the statistical
approach, as it measures the amount of influence on model parameters. However,
it was not found to be applicable to different types of studies, as the underlying
point estimate must be known, and congruent information was not presented
between models because model parameters are treated fundamentally differently
across statistical approaches.
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The third comparison method between the two statistical approaches was a
comparison of frequentist confidence intervals to Bayesian credible intervals.
Concerning the first standard, this comparison method was applicable to both
empirical and simulated data. Regarding the second standard, this comparison
method met four out of the five indicators. Since both intervals can be represented
numerically, the outcome of the comparison would also be numeric and thus
quantifiable in nature. While these intervals did not meet the fifth indicator of
providing congruent information, traditionally these intervals are seen as
counterpart measures across approaches and so some level of meaningful
significance as it pertains to the models and approaches could be discerned. This
comparison method is applicable to different types of studies and does capture the
meaning of the appropriate statistical approach as each interval measures the
interval for the presumed underlying point estimate.
Although not as prevalent in the literature as the first three comparison
methods, this fourth comparison method utilized a standard measure across
statistical approaches. This fourth comparison method utilized kappa scores, a
method of inter-rater agreement for categorical variables, and compared the level
of percent agreement. As for the first standard, kappa scoring can be utilized with
both empirical and simulated data. As for the second standard, this method met
three out of the five indicators. This method carries a quantifiable component, but
also provides a level of significance of results across models. While congruent
information is gained, as the percent agreement is directly comparable across
models, this comparison method is not applicable to all studies, as it deals mainly
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with classification of categorical variables, and does not ultimately capture the
meaning of the statistical approach as it does not deal with the underlying point
estimate.
The final comparison method is only indirectly discussed in the literature,
mainly through a discussion of results from comparison studies or simulations
between the classical and Bayesian approaches to statistics. This final comparison
method was a qualitative comparison, trying to provide a more shaded picture of
the information gained from the models. As for the first standard, this method can
be applied to both empirical and simulated data. As for the second standard, this
comparison method met four out of the five indicators. There is no quantifiable
component, but the qualitative description of the results of the model does speak
to the approach to statistics and also provides some level of meaningful
significance regarding the model. A qualitative comparison is applicable to any
type of model and could easily provide congruent information, in addition to
specific points of differences that might not be highlighted in a quantitative
comparison.
Given this evaluation of the standards and as displayed in the table below,
two comparison methods were found to be most efficient as they pertain to this
comparison process. Consequently, those two methods were applied to the present
example.
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Table 27
Rankings of Comparison Methods for Comparisons between the Classical and
Bayesian Statistical Approaches
First Standard: Applicability
to different types of data

Comparison Method
Simulated
Data

Comparison 1:
Comparison to an
underlying known
estimate

Comparison 2:
Comparison in
terms of bias
present in
parameters

Yes

Yes

Experimental
Data

No

No

Second standard: Measurement of information gained from comparison

Has a
quantifiable
component

Yes

Yes

Has an
ability to
differentiate
results in
terms of
importance

Yes

Yes
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Captures
the
meaning of
the model

Carries
application
to different
types of
studies

Whether
information
that allows
a direct
comparison
is gained

Total
Points

Yes

No; this
method is
only
applicable to
simulated
studies

Yes

5

Yes

No; this
method is
only
applicable
for studies in
which one
can induce
bias and thus
limited to
simulated
studies

No; this
method
does not
provide
comparable
information
because
model
parameters
are
understood
differently
across
approaches

4

Comparison 3:
Comparison
between frequentist
confidence intervals
and Bayesian
credible intervals

Comparison 4:
Comparison of
kappa scores
between the two
methods

Comparison 5:
Comparison
completed
qualitatively,
focusing on
interpretation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No; this
method
does not
provide
directly
comparable
information
because
confidence
intervals
and credible
intervals
represent
different
concepts

No; this
method only
works with
classification
studies

Yes

5

Yes

Yes

6

Yes

Yes

Yes

No; this
method
looks at
only the
congruence
between
percentage
correctly
classified,
which does
not reveal
anything
particular
about the
overall
statistical
approach

Yes

No; this
method is
focused on
discussing
the
differences
in
interpretation

Yes

Yes
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Application of Comparison Methods. The comparison numerically
between confidence intervals and credible intervals is shown in the table below.
Two additional columns are part of this table; one column indicates statistical
significance, and the other table indicates the comparison probability to the
baseline utilized earlier in this section. With this view, a few findings can be seen.
First, the results across the models were quite similar. Looking more closely at a
comparison between the means and the point estimates, differences in the
congressional comparisons ranged from 0.0045 to 0.0054. The presidential
models contained a much larger range between the two models: differences in
corresponding means and point estimates ranged from 0.0005 to 0.02.
Second, statistical significance appeared to correlate with the Bayesian
probabilities. This was more pronounced in the congressional results; however, it
appeared that high probabilities correlate with statistical significance or low pvalues. One interesting result was the comparison between the first and second
presidential eras: the classical approach returned a p-value of .045, which would
fall under the standard alpha level of 0.05. However, the associated probability
was 0.42, which indicates that this mean was only approximately as likely as the
average change in the Democratic two-party presidential vote. A second
interesting result was the saliency of this pattern in the congressional results. Of
course, the p-values are more extreme, but so are the probabilities.
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Table 28
Differences in Point Estimates and Frequentist Confidence Intervals and
Bayesian Credible Intervals for the Presidential Models

Comparison Eras

Difference
in Point
Estimate

Differences in Interval
Bounds

Minimum
Value

Maximum
Value

Differences
in Interval
Range

Associated pvalue

Associated
Probability

1828-1856 to 1860-1892

-0.0048

-0.0006

-0.0090

-0.0084

0.0450

0.4179

1860-1892 to 1896-1928

-0.0239

-0.0211

-0.0268

-0.0057

0.0660

0.1556

1896-1928 to 1932-1960

0.0063

0.0093

-0.0009

-0.0102

0.0020

0.8458

1932-1960 to 1964-2008

-0.0005

0.0039

-0.0042

-0.0081

0.2380

0.1667

Table 29
Differences in Point Estimates and Frequentist Confidence Intervals and
Bayesian Credible Intervals for the Congressional Models
Comparison Eras

Difference
in Point
Estimate

Differences in Interval
Bounds

Minimum
Value

Maximum
Value

Differences in
Interval Range

Associated
p-value

Associated
Probability

1828-1858 to 1860-1894

-0.0045

-0.0048

-0.0055

-0.0007

0.0010

0.7664

1860-1894 to 1896-1930

-0.0054

-0.0045

-0.0058

-0.0013

0.7180

0.0214

1896-1930 to 1932-1994

-0.0048

-0.0054

-0.0057

-0.0003

0.0000

0.9920

1932-1994 to 1996-2008

-0.0052

-0.0066

-0.0066

0.0000

0.0070

0.7405

Next, the two statistical approaches were evaluated qualitatively as they
pertained to these results. Looking through this second comparative lens, two
main points can be made, but with one major caveat. First, and again, the results
are similar. This is seen in closeness of the means and point estimates and in the
closeness of the confidence intervals and credible intervals. Second, the closeness
of these results could lead one to conclude that with some margin of error, both
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approaches would arrive at the same conclusion. In this case, this is true.
However, there is one major caveat to this viewpoint: the interpretations of each
mean, point estimate, credible interval, and confidence interval are very different
between these two approaches. First, the mean references the mean of a
distribution, which means that it is the average point for this random parameter.
However, the point estimate has a very different interpretation: this estimate is
understood as the underlying true value. Consequently, while these values may
appear to be the same, their interpretation is very different.
This same argument applies to the credible intervals and confidence
intervals. While these measures are considered counterparts in the literature, these
two intervals do not represent the same concept. Confidence intervals, with an
alpha level of .05, are typically explained as 95% of the intervals contain the true
estimate. However, this means the answer as it pertains to any one confidence
interval is binary: either the interval contains the point estimate or it does not.
This is differentiated from the Bayesian credible interval, where a 95% Bayesian
credible interval is interpreted as 95% of the posterior distribution lies within that
particular region. Consequently, while the actual numeric values are close, the
interpretation and lens across these measures is again very different.
The main point of the comparison of results from a frequentist and
Bayesian perspective is: while the results are similar, the interpretation of the
results leads to very different conclusions because they stem from very different
philosophical viewpoints. With the current comparison methods available, a
comparison done only numerically may not necessarily highlight this point. While
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a qualitative comparison as this may be included in a discussion of results, it is
important to recognize that this comparison still may be the most efficient way to
compare these statistical approaches.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION
The results presented in the previous chapter underscore the importance of
continued analysis and discussion of critical elections, from both a political
science perspective and a statistical perspective. This chapter extends that
discussion, paying particular attention to the research questions posed at the
beginning of this study. This section begins with a review of the results, explains
their significance, and then turns toward the implications and limitations of this
research before posing avenues for future research.
Summary of Results
Utilizing the classical statistical approach, the beta coefficients of two of
the four election years tested were found to be statistically significant in the
presidential analysis, which was also found for the congressional analysis. The
first year, 1860, saw a reduction in the Democratic two-party percentage of the
presidential vote of almost 6 percentage points with the election of Abraham
Lincoln. Likewise, Congress saw an 11 percentage point reduction in Democratic
seat share within the same election cycle. The second election year, 1932, elected
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency with almost a 10 point swing in the
Democratic percentage of the presidential vote. Again, Congress confirmed this
pattern with a rise in the Democratic seat share of 15 percentage points when
compared to the average Democratic seat share of the previous era.
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The congressional analysis also returned a statistically significant result
when comparing the fourth and fifth eras. This was not seen in the presidential
analysis; however, a number of reasons might explain this result. First, the
demarcation for the fifth era was different between the presidential and
congressional analysis. This is due to literature surrounding the context of election
cycles in Congress and the presumption of a gradual shift instead of a strong
swing in one election cycle (Campbell, 2006). Second, while both outcomes are
national indicators, the presidential vote may mask a national swing in party
dominance due to the level of aggregation, whereas enough disaggregation may
exist in seat shares such that a swing may still be noticeable. Third, in spite of the
different demarcations of the congressional eras, the timing of the presidential
election may still not capture the swing in political climate and dominance. Given
that congressional elections occur more frequently, this may better display the
political climate and geography at the time.
Generally, the results of the Bayesian analysis yielded similar conclusions.
For the congressional analysis, there was a 76.64% probability that the change
seen between the first and second era was greater than the average change seen in
Democratic seat share between any two congressional election years, and there
was a 99.20% probability that the change seen between the third and fourth eras
was greater than the average change seen between any two congressional election
years. The presidential results also returned a high probability that the change
between the third and fourth eras was greater than the average change seen in the
Democratic two-party percentage of the presidential vote at 84.58%. The only
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exception to this statement was the presidential election of 1860. This presidential
election had an only 41.79% probability that the change seen here between eras
was greater than the average change in the Democratic two-party percentage of
presidential vote seen between any two election years. However, this finding did
coincide with the results of the classical presidential analysis; while the resultant
p-value was statistically significant, the p-value fell right at the cut-off for
significance with a value of 0.045.
The last portion of the results section sought to formally compare the
results of the two statistical approaches. This was done by applying a set of
standards uniformly across five different comparison methods that were noted in
the literature. The five comparison methods were comparisons to known
estimates, comparisons in terms of bias present in parameters, comparisons
between frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals,
comparisons between kappa scores, and a qualitative comparison between the two
approaches. After ranking these five comparison methods on a set of standards,
two comparison methods were found to be most efficient: first, the comparison
between confidence intervals and credible intervals; and second, the qualitative
comparison. Each of these comparison methods has their strengths. The interval
comparison carries a quantifiable component whereas the qualitative comparison
allows for all differences to be highlighted and discussed at length. Applying
these comparison methods to the topic at hand, the comparison between intervals
was very close numerically, but did not highlight easily that the two point
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estimates demonstrate very different concepts. The latter point was the primary
objective of the second qualitative comparison.
Importance of Findings
Consequently, the results of this study yield two main findings: first,
critical elections were found in 1860 and 1932; and second, the most efficient
methods of comparison between the classical and Bayesian statistical approaches
are a comparison of confidence and credible intervals and a qualitative
comparison. The first main finding is discussed, followed by a discussion of the
second finding. Uncovering critical elections in 1860 and 1932 is important for a
couple of different reasons. First, the identification of critical elections indicates
shifts in the American electorate and political climate. This means that the
American electorate is not static and is responsive to different stimuli within the
political climate, whether that be economic change, a change in demographics, or
a shift in the ideological stances of the parties (Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau,
1995).
Further, this identification of critical elections and the ability to replicate
some of the results discussed by Campbell (2006) discredits the argument made
by Mayhew (2002). Mayhew (2002) argued that the empirical validity of some
previous work on the topic was questionable, as he and others were not able to
replicate prior results. The study completed in this work utilized more electoral
history than Campbell’s 2006 work, which could explain a lack of complete
congruence in results; however, the partial replication of this work defies
Mayhew’s validity claim. Mayhew also claimed that creating a typology of
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elections only served that purpose--that there is no greater reason for such
classification, and in fact, the classification creates a narrow perspective through
which to view American electoral history (Mayhew, 2002). One could argue,
however, that the identification of such elections actually carries the opposite
effect. By identifying critical elections and then closely evaluating the historical
context, factors which carry a motivating effect on the electorate might be
realized and then utilized to forecast future eras of realignment within American
electoral history (Carmines & Wagner, 2006).
Continuing in this vein, Mayhew’s claims were not discredited by only
one statistical approach. The closeness of the results across approaches serve as
confirmation for the elections that were identified as realigning. Obviously
differences in interpretation between approaches exist; however, the same
substantial result was achieved. Extending this point further, not only are results
confirmed across approaches, but this comparison also indicates that the
identification of critical elections is not dependent upon the classical approach to
statistics. The ability to apply a secondary approach to the same topic and find the
same results is not only confirmation of those results, but adds credence to the
theory.
Other contributions of this study to the field exist. One contribution of the
classical approach is the addition of election years to previous work, such as
Campbell’s 2006 work, and partial confirmation of his results. A second
contribution of the classical approach is the accessibility of the approach and
subsequent results, as Bayesian methods, until recently, were limited due to a lack
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of inclusion in standard statistical packages (Peck, 2015) and the dominance of
frequentist methods in statistics programs (Bolstad, 2002). Alternatively,
Bayesian methods are able to incorporate a more direct expression of uncertainty
through the use of prior distributions (van de Schoot et al., 2013) and also produce
a more precise result, providing a numeric probability instead of a statement
concerning statistical significance (Lilford & Braunholtz, 1996). While not all
researchers present results in this way, the focus on statistical significance can
lead to incorrect conclusions (Kirk, 1996) and a dichotomous view that may be
better explained through probabilistic terms (Rothman, 2014). However, while
both approaches offer contributions, one could argue that Bayesian methods
perform better at identifying critical elections for two reasons: first, Bayesian
methods better capture the social science situation under study; and second,
Bayesian methods provide a probability which is perhaps more easily
interpretable than a p-value (Kruschke, 2011).
The second main finding of the work presented here concerns comparisons
between the classical and Bayesian statistical approaches. The results discussed
above identified a comparison between confidence and credible intervals and a
comparison done qualitatively as the most effective. This finding is important for
several reasons. First, there is no formalized way to compare the classical and
Bayesian approaches. Some theorists have attempted a compromise between the
two approaches, but none have been adopted due to a lack of justification from
either perspective (Berger, Boukai, & Wang, 1997). Consequently, this work
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contributes to the field by drawing attention to this need, illustrating its
importance, and also providing a starting point for the conversation.
Tangential to this first point, the comparison between frequentist and
Bayesian approaches highlights their philosophical differences. Some comparison
methods captured the meaning of the model, or accounted for the philosophical
difference, but then information was either not directly comparable or the method
only worked on simulated data. The only exception to this rule was the qualitative
comparison. This demonstrates that not only has a formal comparison not been
developed, but a solid formal comparison needs to account for the differences in
perspective across approaches.
One other main contribution of this study is the systematic review of
comparison methods and their relative strengths. As previously mentioned, the
five methods utilized were the following: first, a comparison to a known,
underlying point estimate; second, a comparison in terms of bias present in the
models; third, a comparison of frequentist confidence intervals to Bayesian
credible intervals; fourth, a comparison of kappa scores; and fifth, a qualitative
comparison. Beginning with a comparison to a known, underlying estimate, the
relative strength of this method is the differential amount between the result of the
model and true point estimate. One is able to know with complete certainty the
true distance between the two values. Likewise, the relative strength for the
comparison in terms of bias is that the true amount of bias in each of the
parameter estimates is known. The actual effect of inducing bias in the model is
known, again, with complete certainty. The fourth method of comparison noted
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above is the comparison of kappa scores. The relative strength of this method is
that information on the same scale and with the same implications is compared.
This is obviously the highest standard; however, this method is only applicable to
classification studies. The comparison between the two intervals is quantifiable
and easily reported from analyses using the models. It can also be applied in
empirical settings, and carries applicability to different types of studies. Lastly,
comparing the two approaches qualitatively also carries a few relative strengths.
First, incorporating a qualitative comparison allows for complexities pertaining to
the models to be identified and discussed in full, such as qualifying statements
that might not be immediately noticed or incorporated into other methods of
comparison. Likewise, a qualitative comparison also allows for the discussion to
reflect the uniqueness of the statistical approach--again, a characteristic that may
not be available with other comparisons.
Implications for Theory and Practice
A few implications exist for the field as a result of this study. First, the
presence of statistically significant results not only demonstrates that the
electorate is not static, but also supports continued study of the theory. Carmines
and Wagner (2006) have begun this conversation, acknowledging the critiques
concerning the usefulness of the theory, but purport that looking beneath the
elections themselves to the evolution of issues over time may further enhance the
perspective of realignment theory.
A second implication for both theory and practice stems one main
difference between the two statistical approaches: the treatment of the parameters
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as either fixed or random estimates. This study highlights the need for researchers
to be aware of this particular difference in the treatment of parameters. It not only
asks that researchers be aware and knowledgeable about this difference, but to
also ensure that the method applied appropriately captures the targeted
understanding of the final estimate. Likewise, the choice of approach is not only
realized in the final result, but can also be evident in the statement and
operationalization of the research question. Bayesian methods allow for other
questions to be asked of the data (Austin, Naylor, & Tu, 2000; Kruschke, 2011),
which influences model development and operationalization of the question.
A final point of consideration for theory and practice is the prior
distribution utilized in the model. While Bayesian analysis is useful as it makes
uncertainty explicit (Coory, Wills, & Barnett, 2009), one point of contention is the
use of prior distributions in Bayesian models. Some researchers note the difficulty
in setting prior probabilities (Chang & Boral, 2008), and proponents of the
frequentist approach argue that misspecified prior distributions can alter results
and induce bias in the model (Bennett, Crowe, Price, Stamey & Seaman, Jr.,
2013). Proponents of the Bayesian approach counter that ignoring prior
information on the topic also biases results. Consequently, the use and
specification of prior distributions is not only a contentious topic of discussion for
researchers between the two camps, but is also an area that the Bayesian
researcher should treat carefully.
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Study Limitations
Limitations exist to the results presented here. First, national datasets were
used. Although the decision to use national datasets was based on other research
on this topic, the use of such data presumes a national realignment. Realignments
could occur regionally, by state, or even on a local level. The use of national data
may mask the presence of lower level realignments, and a realignment, for
instance, in the North may not be realized by a direct and opposite reversal in the
South. Consequently, a more full investigation should be done, and would involve
testing for realignments at other levels of government.
A second limitation to the results presented here is the particular definition
for “critical election” utilized within this study. This study utilized a definition by
Brunell, Grofman, and Merrill, III (2012) of a decisive and durable shift in party
dominance. Other definitions of critical elections exist, and the operationalization
of these definitions could also affect the outcomes of this study.
A third and intertwined limitation is the demarcation of critical elections
utilized within this study. One major assumption made within this study is that
critical elections have occurred only at the elections tested in this study. While the
choice of 1860, 1896, 1932, and 1964 were based on previous research, this study
is limited in testing only those elections and did not seek to uncover any other
potential elections. Related to this discussion is the demarcation of the fifth
congressional era. Instead of spanning the same timeframe as the presidential
analysis, the fourth congressional era was expanded, consequently reducing the
number of elections in the fifth congressional era. This decision was based on
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literature and the situational understanding of a gradual change in Congress;
however, this delineation of eras could potentially alter results.
A fourth limitation to the study presented here relates to the data and
methods utilized. This study utilized secondary data, collected from national
sources. However, any data misreported in those sources, or any subsequent
miscoding by the researcher, could influence results. Likewise, not only the use of
the particular definition of critical election discussed here, but also its
operationalization and how that affects the choice of method could also alter
results. This study was highly influenced by Campbell’s 2006 work, as it was the
most comprehensive work on the topic of critical elections. However, choices
made by the researcher as it pertains to data sources, years included, and methods
utilized could also influence results.
The operationalization of the research question also affects the Bayesian
analysis undertaken here. Since critical realignment theory requires a durable shift
in party power (Brunell, Grofman, & Merrill III, 2012), this limits analyses to a
retrospective look. This perspective, combined with the current operationalized
definition of critical elections, greatly hinders the application of Bayesian
methods. While still applicable, the strength of Bayesian approach is seen in the
method’s ability to account for prior information. However, due to the
operationalization presented here, this strength is not seen to its fullest extent.
Avenues for Future Research
Given these limitations, many avenues for future research exist. This study
assumed a certain definition of critical elections; one could investigate the effect
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of operationalizing that definition differently. Likewise, this study also tested only
specific, presupposed critical elections; one could test other elections to
investigate whether other realigning eras exist. This study also used national data;
consequently, looking at a different level of government might also influence
results. The perspective of issue evolution within and across elections could also
be investigated. However, the major avenue for further research stemming from
this study is the development of a metric through which to compare the classical
and Bayesian statistical approaches. As was denoted in this study, comparison
methods exist between the two approaches; however, many of these methods do
not directly compare both approaches, taking into account the basis of the
approach. More research is needed to explore whether such a comparison is
possible, given the different treatment of probability.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This study began from one main point of difference: the treatment of
probability between the classical approach and the Bayesian approach to statistics.
The difference is substantial: in the classical approach, probability is treated as a
long-term frequency of a particular event occurring, whereas in the Bayesian
approach, probability is viewed as a degree of uncertainty. In theory, this is
simply a difference in definition; however, in practice, the implications of that
difference require more thought regarding the applicability of the approach. The
classical approach, due to its definition of a long-term frequency, asks that
conditions remain precisely the same among random replicates of the measured
phenomenon. Social science situations rarely meet this requirement, and elections
are no different. The change in voters, issues, and candidates impede the
actualization of this requirement, leading to an inadequate application of the
classical approach to statistics in this setting. This situation is then only
compounded by the controversy that exists over set significance levels. As these
levels are set arbitrarily and in particular, are interpreted dichotomously (i.e.,
either the result is statistically significant or not), the results of these analyses are
limited in their interpretation and, thus, in practical significance. Consequently,
this main difference between statistical approaches requires a reevaluation of
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social science phenomena, and in this particular case, critical elections, from a
new perspective.
Based on this difference and its implications for practice, this study sought
to understand the question of critical elections through the Bayesian statistical
approach. The purpose of this was two-fold: first, prior to this study, Bayesian
modeling had not been applied to the study of critical elections in American
electoral history; and second, critical elections had not been evaluated in this way,
meaning that new information pertaining to critical elections might be uncovered.
This study sought to expand Bayesian methods to this topic, but also see what
further information could be gained regarding critical elections through this
viewpoint. This purpose resulted in the statement of six research questions: the
first three relating to the field of political science and the latter three relating to
the field of research methods and statistics. The first three questions looked at the
occurrence of critical elections from the classical approach and the Bayesian
approach, evaluating the contribution of each approach to the identification of
such elections. The latter three questions focused on a comparison between
approaches, discussing the relative strengths of comparison methods derived from
literature in addition to information gained from the application of the most
efficient method to the comparison at hand.
The scope of this study was limited to an evaluation of the traditionally
accepted critical elections: 1860, 1896, and 1932. The election of 1964 was added
to the analysis based on evidence found in literature. The study as a whole took a
national perspective, and elections between 1828 and 2008 were evaluated. This
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section will first provide a summary of the study in its entirety, followed by some
concluding thoughts.
For many researchers, V.O. Key (1955) is credited with deriving the base
of critical realignment theory. He perceived elections as acts of “collective
decision”, and perceived critical elections as ones where the result is a sharp
change in party lines which persists for subsequent elections (Key, 1955). Other
influential researchers in the field, such as Schattschneider (1960), Burnham
(1970), Sundquist (1973), and Kleppner (1987), followed in his footsteps, each
providing their unique contribution to the field of critical realignment theory. In
the end, we find that critical elections are characterized by highly concerned and
polarized voters (Key, 1955) at times when the ideological distance between
parties grows (Burnham, 1970). Oftentimes critical elections result in new party
lines, splicing the electorate at a national level along current, highly politicized
issues (Key, 1955; Schattschneider, 1960).
Such elections can occur for a variety of reasons, but those reasons are
generally grouped into three main categories: the conversion of voters, the
mobilization of voters, or the demobilization of voters (Darmofal & Nardulli,
2010). The conversion thesis posits that a critical election will occur if enough
voters change their party attachment from one party to the opposing party. This
can happen for a number of reasons, such as the strength of the local and state
parties, group membership, or the rise of divisive issues (Burnham, 1970;
Darmofal & Nardulli, 2010; Kleppner, 1987; Sundquist, 1973; Zingher, 2014).
The mobilization thesis explains a rise in voter turnout, as previous non-voters
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become inclined to vote. Oftentimes the high intensity of the political climate,
potentially due to divisive issues, encourages political participation of this group
which subsequently changes the current balance of parties and can cause a critical
election (Andersen, 1979; Beck, 1982; Wanat & Burke, 1982). Lastly, the
demobilization thesis posits that a critical election can occur based on the
alienation of once active, partisan voters. This occurs most predominantly through
the disillusionment with one’s party platform (Kleppner, 1987).
Arguably, through these theses, critical elections have occurred at specific
timepoints throughout American electoral history. The traditionally accepted
elections are 1860, 1896, and 1932. Given literature on the political climate at the
time, the election of 1964 was also added to the analysis presented in this study.
These elections were the ones evaluated throughout this work. However, not all
researchers agree with the inclusion of these specified elections, or with a theory
of a cyclical realignment throughout American electoral history. Mayhew (2002)
argues against the entire genre on three main points: first, the validity of the
empirical work completed; second, the added benefit of the genre; and third, the
lack of relevancy to the present day. He takes issue with some of the empirical
work, as he and others have not been able to replicate it, but more so he argues
that there is little benefit to identifying critical elections. He argues that not all
elections are equal—some are more important than others, but to classify
elections in such a way as this creates a useless dichotomy. This dichotomy does
nothing to propel the genre forward and instead constrains more interesting work
on the topic. His third point is that critical elections have not followed the pattern
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prescribed; consequently, while there may have been a cyclical look earlier in
history, the lack of a known critical election in recent history illustrates the lack of
relevancy of the genre.
As stated previously, these elections were evaluated through both the
classical statistical approach and the Bayesian statistical approach. The classical
approach is more known, and is also referred to as the frequentist approach.
Although an older technique, the Bayesian approach has laid dormant for a
number of years due to a lack of computing power. Bayesian methods are
predicated on the idea of conditional probability, and uses those probabilities,
conditional on data, to express beliefs about unknown quantities. There are three
main components to Bayesian methods--the prior, the likelihood, and the
posterior, and it is the prior distribution, or previously known information
concerning an event, that is combined with the evidence at hand to create the
posterior distribution. For this study, the posterior distribution was obtained via
Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations, and it is the mean and standard deviation
of that posterior distribution that serves as the point estimate.
To assess whether Bayesian methods provide any improvement over the
classical approach as it pertains to the identification of critical elections, the
elections of 1860, 1896, 1932, and 1964 were tested through both the classical
approach and the Bayesian approach. Two sets of analyses were run; one set of
models utilized the Democratic two-party percentage of the presidential vote as
the outcome variable, and the second set of models utilized the Democratic seat
share within the U.S. House of Representatives as the outcome variable.
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Secondary data were used, and were gathered from the Office of the Clerk within
the U.S. House of Representatives, the Historical Statistics of the United States,
and the CQ Press' Guide to U.S. Elections. In order to test the hypothesized
critical elections, eras were formed with the hypothesized critical election
beginning the next era. For example, within the presidential analysis, the first era
spanned from 1828 to 1856, the second era spanned from 1860 to 1892, the third
era spanned from 1896 to 1928, the fourth era spanned from 1932 to 1960, and
the fifth era spanned from 1964 to 2008. It should be noted that the fifth
congressional era began with 1996 instead of 1964. From here, the data were
coded to represent the appropriate era and regressions were run to assess the mean
difference between the current era and the most previous era.
To further understand any improvements of the Bayesian approach over
the frequentist approach, a formal comparison between the two approaches was
also conducted. A review of the literature identified five methods of comparison
used by other researchers. These methods included a comparison to a known
estimate, a comparison in terms of bias, a comparison of frequentist confidence
intervals and Bayesian credible intervals, a comparison of kappa scores, and a
qualitative comparison. These different methods were ranked based on developed
criteria and the highest ranked methods were applied to the question at hand.
The analysis of the presidential data found two critical elections, one in
1860 and one in 1932. The sign on the coefficient was of the expected direction in
both cases, corroborated by the election of Republican President Abraham
Lincoln in 1860 and the election of Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt
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in 1932. The congressional analysis supported these results, and also found a
critical election in 1996. Furthermore, the Bayesian models served to confirm
these results, as most of the probabilities of these results being greater than the
average change in that outcome variable were relatively high. The one outlying
result was the first critical election in the presidential analysis. For this 1860
election, there was a 41.79% probability that the change seen between the first
and second eras was greater than the average change in the Democratic two-party
percentage of the presidential vote. However, there was an 84.58% probability
that the change seen between the third and fourth eras was greater than the
average change in the same outcome variable. For the congressional analysis,
there was a 76.64% probability that the change seen between the first and second
eras was greater than the average change in Democratic seat share, and there was
a 99.20% probability that the change seen between the third and fourth eras was
greater than the average change seen in the same outcome variable.
As discussed, methods of comparing the frequentist and Bayesian
statistical approaches were also evaluated and ranked according to a developed set
of standards. This evaluation resulted in two comparison methods being applied to
the topic at hand: first, the comparison between frequentist confidence intervals
and Bayesian credible intervals; and second, the qualitative comparison. The first
comparison method resulted in very similar point estimates, but did not account
for the difference in understanding between the intervals developed with the
frequentist and Bayesian analyses. The second comparison method was able to
account for the differences between these two methods, but did not provide a
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numerical comparison. Overall, results were very similar, both numerically and in
the identification of critical elections; however, it is to be remembered that the
interpretation of these intervals is very different.
Returning to the research questions, the first three questions were focused
on the contribution of each statistical approach to the genre of critical realignment
theory as well as noting any improvements of the Bayesian approach over the
classical approach as it pertains to the identification of critical elections. From this
study, the contributions of the classical approach to the field of critical
realignment theory are the expansion and extension of Campbell’s work with the
addition of nearly 50 years of elections, but more so the accessibility of results.
Due to the familiarity of the classical approach and the presentation of results in
typical studies, the accessibility of such results is high and is certainly a benefit
and contribution of the classical approach. Turning toward the Bayesian approach,
the main contribution of Bayesian methods to the theory is the precision with
which results are presented. Instead of a dichotomous statement regarding
statistical significance in the classical approach, Bayesian methods yield a
probability that represents a comparison between the simulated point estimates
from the posterior distribution and a predetermined baseline. However, as to
whether this aids in the identification of critical elections is a moot point; the
classical approach does offer a more concise method.
The latter three research questions focused on the contribution of this
study to the field of research methods and statistics, and more specifically, on the
formal comparison method between the two approaches. As discussed previously,
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five comparison methods were found in the literature, and the fourth research
question evaluated each comparison method for its relative strength. After ranking
these comparison methods by their relative strength, the fifth research question
surrounded the application of that method to the question at hand. Through the
comparison of confidence and credible intervals with an additional qualitative
comparison, it was noted that the results, both numerically and substantively,
were very similar. However, it is important to note that while similar numbers
were returned for each set of intervals, the interpretation of these intervals is very
different.
The last research question was focused on gathering further information
regarding the two statistical approaches from the completion of these
comparisons. This question highlighted the increased precision from the Bayesian
approach. This is seen in both the comparison between confidence and credible
intervals and the probability associated with the mean estimates. In the classical
approach, 95% of confidence intervals contain the true parameter. This means that
with any one interval, either the true parameter falls within the interval or it does
not. In the Bayesian approach, the 95% credible interval consistently demarcates a
region that contains 95% of the probability distribution. This leads to a statement
of greater certainty in the Bayesian approach. Likewise, instead of using an
arbitrarily set significance level in the classical approach where the answer is
typically interpreted in a dichotomous fashion, the Bayesian approach has the
flexibility to return a probability associated with a certain point estimate.
Regardless, the overarching contribution of this study is to be aware, informed,
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and cognizant of the differences in interpretation and more so the treatment of
parameters between the two methods. This carries strong implications for
researchers and practitioners, as choosing a method which does not describe the
practical situation being modeled may lead to inadequate conclusions.
Based on this summary, a few conclusions can be reached. First, while
philosophical differences are apparent between the Bayesian and classical
statistical approaches, the conclusions of this study result in the same substantive
outcome. Interpretations differ between the two approaches, but it is still
considered as confirmatory that both methods resulted in the same critical
junctures. Second, while comparisons between statistical approaches can be made,
much room exists for work to be done as it pertains to the development of a
formal, comparative statistic. As presented earlier, some methods currently exist,
but these do not capture the philosophical differences that exist between the two
approaches. This carries great implications for interpretation.
Finally, the last main conclusion of this work is that critical elections are a
part of the United States’ electoral history. As Darmofal and Nardulli (2010) note,
these types of elections are important as they serve to hold political elites
accountable. Consequently, understanding their occurrence and frequency
becomes a near necessity. While Mayhew (2002) may argue that critical elections
have lost relevancy and are no longer a part of the United States’ electoral cycle,
the election of President Obama in 2008 particularly followed by the election of
President Trump in 2016 may provide evidence counter to that claim. While it is
too early to fully analyze these elections utilizing the methods discussed here,
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preliminary evidence may suggest a shift. Ball’s comment that the “old
[Republican] party establishment went into exile, perhaps never to return” (2016)
may suggest a new political cleavage, and his comments regarding Republicans
leaving the party could provide further evidence of conversion or demobilization.
Regardless of the occurrence of a ‘true’ critical election, the prospect is certainly
intriguing for political scientists and demands further study.
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APPENDIX A

Figure A1. Scatterplot demonstrating the homoscedasticity of the presidential
models.

Figure A2. Scatterplot demonstrating the homoscedasticity of the congressional
models.

135

Figure A3. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the Democratic twoparty presidential vote and the first era, 1828-1856.

Figure A4. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the Democratic twoparty presidential vote and the second era, 1860-1892.
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Figure A5. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the Democratic twoparty presidential vote and the third era, 1896-1928.

Figure A6. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the Democratic twoparty presidential vote and the fourth era, 1932-1960.
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Figure A7. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the Democratic twoparty presidential vote and the fifth era, 1964-2008.

Figure A8. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the first era, 1828-1858.
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Figure A9. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the second era, 1860-1894.

Figure A10. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the third era, 1896-1930.
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Figure A11. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the fourth era, 1932-1994.

Figure A12. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the fifth era, 1996-2008.
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Figure A13. Scatterplot demonstrating the linearity between the U.S. House
between Representative seat share and the general election surge.
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Figure B1. SAS programming used for the presidential Bayesian models, using a
non-informative prior distribution.
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Figure B2. SAS programming used for the congressional Bayesian models, using
a non-informative prior distribution.
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Figure B3. SAS programming used for the presidential Bayesian models, using an
informative prior distribution.
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Figure B4. SAS programming used for the congressional Bayesian models, using
an informative prior distribution.
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Figure B5. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B6. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B7. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B8. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B9. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B10. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B11. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B12. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B13. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B14. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B15. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B16. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B17. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B18. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B19. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.

169

Figure B20. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B21. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B22. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B23. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B24. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1856 and 18601892 eras.
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Figure B25. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B26. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B27. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B28. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1892 and 18961928 eras.
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Figure B29. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B30. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B31. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1932-1960 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B32. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1928 and 19321960 eras.
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Figure B33. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1828-1856 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B34. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1860-1892 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B35. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1896-1928 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B36. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative presidential model parameter of the
1964-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1960 and 19642008 eras.
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Figure B37. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B38. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B39. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B40. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B41. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1828-1858 and 1860-1894 eras.

191

Figure B42. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B43. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B44. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B45. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B46. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1860-1894 and 1896-1930 eras.
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Figure B47. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B48. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B49. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B50. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.

200

Figure B51. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1896-1930 and 1932-1994 eras.
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Figure B52. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.

202

Figure B53. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B54. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B55. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter of
the 1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B56. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the non-informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1932-1994 and 1996-2008 eras.
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Figure B57. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.

207

Figure B58. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.

208

Figure B59. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B60. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1828-1858 and 18601894 eras.
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Figure B61. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1828-1858 and 1860-1894 eras.
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Figure B62. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B63. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B64. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B65. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1860-1894 and 18961930 eras.
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Figure B66. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1860-1894 and 1896-1930 eras.
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Figure B67. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B68. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B69. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1932-1994 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B70. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1896-1930 and 19321994 eras.
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Figure B71. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1896-1930 and 1932-1994 eras.
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Figure B72. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1828-1858 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B73. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1860-1894 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B74. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1896-1930 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B75. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter of the
1996-2008 era, when testing the difference between the 1932-1994 and 19962008 eras.
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Figure B76. Graphs of autocorrelation, adequate mixing of the chain, and the
posterior distribution for the informative congressional model parameter
controlling for general election surge, when testing the difference between the
1932-1994 and 1996-2008 eras.
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APPENDIX C
Table C1. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the presidential data, comparing
1828-1856 to 1860-1892.
Variable

Prior Information

Posterior Information

Mean

Standard Deviation

Mean

Standard Deviation

Equal Tail Interval

Highest Posterior Density

1828-1856

-

-

-

-

-

-

1860-1892

0

0.4000

-0.0563

0.0305

(-0.1158, 0.0037)

(-0.1162, 0.0028)

1896-1928

0

0.0333

-0.0891

0.0306

(-0.1496, -0.0288)

(-0.1517, -0.0317)

1932-1960

0

0.0625

-0.0127

0.0315

(-0.0740, 0.0503)

(-0.0738, 0.0504)

1964-2008

0

0.0833

-0.0436

0.0287

(-0.1004, 0.0130)

(-0.1020, 0.0112)

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5375

0.022

(0.4943, 0.5816)

(0.4938, 0.5805)

DIC: -119.385

Table C2. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the presidential data, comparing
1860-1892 to 1896-1928.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1856

0

Standard
Deviation
0.1111

Mean
0.0569

Standard
Deviation
0.0306

1860-1892

-

-

-

-

1896-1928

0

0.0333

-0.0325

0.0297

1932-1960

0

0.0625

0.0439

0.0306

1964-2008

0

0.0833

0.0130

0.0277

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4809

0.0208

Equal Tail
Interval
(-0.0026,
0.1170)
-

Highest Posterior
Density
(-0.0030, 0.1160)

(-0.0911,
0.0262)
(-0.0158,
0.1059)
(-0.0423,
0.0675)
(0.4400,
0.5222)

(-0.0921, 0.0246)

-

(-0.0173, 0.1032)
(-0.0394, 0.0701)
(0.4376, 0.5192)

DIC: -119.384

Table C3. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the presidential data, comparing
1896-1928 to 1932-1960.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1856

0

Standard
Deviation
0.1111

Mean
0.0891

Standard
Deviation
0.0306

1860-1892

0

0.4000

0.0319

0.0297

1896-1928

-

-

-

-

1932-1960

0

0.0625

0.0761

0.0306
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Equal Tail
Interval
(0.0296,
0.1492)
(-0.0267,
0.0906)
(0.0164,
0.1381)

Highest Posterior
Density
(0.0293, 0.1483)
(-0.0277, 0.0890)
(0.0149, 0.1354)

1964-2008

0

0.0833

0.0452

0.0277

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.4487

0.0208

(-0.0101,
0.0997)
(0.4078,
0.4900)

(-0.0072, 0.1023)
(0.4054, 0.4870)

DIC: -119.384

Table C4. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the presidential data, comparing
1932-1960 to 1964-2008.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1856

0

Standard
Deviation
0.1111

Mean
0.0131

Standard
Deviation
0.0314

1860-1892

0

0.4000

-0.0442

0.0306

1896-1928

0

0.0333

-0.0761

0.0306

1932-1960

-

-

-

-

1964-2008

0

0.0833

-0.0309

0.0287

Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.5247

0.0221

Equal Tail
Interval
(-0.0482,
0.0749)
(-0.1046,
0.0162)
(-0.1357, 0.0148)
(-0.0880,
0.0256)
(0.4813,
0.5686)

Highest Posterior
Density
(-0.0486, 0.0739)
(-0.1066, 0.0134)
(-0.1379, -0.0171)
(-0.0875, 0.0257)
(0.4803, 0.5669)

DIC: -119.385

Table C5. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the congressional data, comparing
1828-1858 to 1860-1894.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1858

-

Standard
Deviation
-

Mean
-

Standard
Deviation
-

Equal Tail
Interval
-

Highest Posterior
Density
-

1858-1894

0

0.0330

-0.1123

0.0343

(-0.1794, 0.0449)
(-0.1983, 0.0636)
(-0.0405,
0.0792)
(-0.1829, 0.0064)
(-0.0027,
0.0008)
(0.5306,
0.6281)

(-0.1802, -0.0464)

1896-1930

0

0.0400

-0.1310

0.0341

1932-1994

0

0.0400

0.0194

0.0305

1996-2008

0

0.0400

-0.0951

0.0449

General Election
Surge
Constant

0

1.00E-06

-0.0010

0.0009

0

1.00E-06

0.5800

0.0249

DIC: -156.938
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(-0.1974, -0.0631)
(-0.0342, 0.0773)
(-0.1812, -0.0051)
(-0.0026, 0.0008)
(0.5317, 0.6286)

Table C6. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the congressional data, comparing
1860-1894 to 1896-1930.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1858

0

Standard
Deviation
0.0400

Mean
0.1115

Standard
Deviation
0.0343

Equal Tail
Interval
(0.0445, 0.1790)

Highest Posterior
Density
(0.0436, 0.1775)

1858-1894

-

-

-

-

-

-

1896-1930

0

0.0400

0.0330

0

0.0400

(-0.0839,
0.0460)
(0.0735, 0.1889)

(-0.0827, 0.0471)

1932-1994

0.0190
0.1314

1996-2008

0

0.0169

0.0441

0.0449

(-0.0703, 0.1032)

General Election
Surge
Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.0009

0

1.00E-06

0.0009
0.4681

(-0.0698,
0.1041)
(-0.0027,
0.0008)
(0.4215, 0.5136)

0.0293

0.0235

(0.0725, 0.1876)

(-0.0027, 0.0008)
(0.4223, 0.5139)

DIC: -156.938

Table C7. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the congressional data, comparing
1896-1930 to 1932-1994.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

Posterior Information

1828-1858

0

Standard
Deviation
0.0400

Mean
0.1301

Standard
Deviation
0.0344

1858-1894

0

0.0333

0.0181

0.0330

1896-1930

-

-

-

-

(-0.0468,
0.0831)
-

1932-1994

0

0.0400

0.1500

0.0294

(0.0920, 0.2076)

(0.0911, 0.2063)

1996-2008

0

0.0400

0.0354

0.0442

(-0.0519, 0.1217)

General Election
Surge
Constant

0

1.00E-06

0.0009

0

1.00E-06

0.0009
0.4495

(-0.0513,
0.1227)
(-0.0027,
0.0008)
(0.4028, 0.4951)

0.0235

Equal Tail
Interval
(0.0629, 0.1977)

Highest Posterior
Density
(0.0621, 0.1962)
(-0.0455, 0.0843)
-

(-0.0026, 0.0009)
(0.4052, 0.4970)

DIC: -156.938

Table C8. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the congressional data, comparing
1932-1994 to 1996-2008.
Variable

Prior Information
Mean

1828-1858

0

Standard
Deviation
0.0400

1858-1894

0

0.0333

1896-1930

0

0.0400

1932-1994

-

-

Posterior Information
Mean
0.0197
0.1316
0.1496
-

Standard
Deviation
0.0306
0.0290
0.0292
-
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Equal Tail
Interval
(-0.0794,
0.0404)
(-0.1891, 0.0739)
(-0.2068, 0.0920)
-

Highest Posterior
Density
(-0.0802, 0.0390)
(-0.1903, -0.0761)
(-0.2072, -0.0930)
-

1996-2008

0

0.0400

General Election
Surge
Constant

0

1.00E-06

0

1.00E-06

0.1144
0.0009
0.5993

0.0413
0.0009
0.0175

DIC: -156.938
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(-0.1954, 0.0322)
(-0.0027,
0.0008)
(0.5647, 0.6330)

(-0.1964, -0.0342)
(-0.0027, 0.0008)
(0.5658, 0.6337)

